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COMMENT
Enacting a Health Information Confidentiality Law: Can
Congress Beat the Deadline?
I. INTRODUCTION
Americans are worried about their privacy. Surveys consistently
indicate widespread concern about access to and use of personal
information by others,' with the privacy of health-related information
the object of particular concern.2 Unfortunately, the public has good
reason to be worried. Health-related information has become a
valuable commodity used for a vast number of purposes unrelated or
only indirectly related to the provision of care; many Americans
would be shocked to learn the breadth of individuals and
organizations with access to their most sensitive information.3 At the
same time, access to health information is critical for the efficient
delivery of and payment for quality care, as well as for numerous
other activities that benefit society.4 Currently, use of health
information is governed by a patchwork of federal and state laws that
provides inconsistent and often ineffectual privacy protections and
that inhibits the increasingly computerized flow of data.' In recent
years, consensus has developed that a uniform, comprehensive
federal health confidentiality law should replace this patchwork of
statutes and cases.6 Despite this consensus, each attempt to enact
such a law during the past eighteen years has failed, largely because
1. Equifax, Inc., one of the nation's largest consumer information agencies, has
commissioned Lou Harris & Associates to conduct a survey of attitudes toward
information privacy issues each year since 1990. The percentage of respondents who
were "very" or "somewhat" concerned about threats to personal privacy was 83% in
1994, EQuIFAX/HARRIS CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY (1994), and 82% in 1995, id.
(1995). In 1995, 80% of respondents agreed that "consumers have lost all control over
how personal information about them is circulated and used by companies." Id. (1995).
2. In a 1993 Equifax/Harris survey focusing specifically on privacy of health-related
information, 85% of the respondents said that protecting the confidentiality of health data
is "absolutely essential" or "very important." EQUIFAX/HARRiS HEALTH CARE
INFORMATION PRIVACY SURVEY (1993).
3. See infra note 49 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 25-36 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 76-170 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
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privacy advocates and members of the health care industry cannot
agree on numerous points7 concerning this extraordinarily complex
issue.8 In 1996, Congress enacted an August 1999 deadline for
passage of health confidentiality legislation.9 If this deadline is not
met, privacy rights and confidentiality obligations regarding
computerized health data will be determined solely by regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS").1 If the past serves as any indication, disagreements on
several key issues may cause the deadline to pass without
congressional action."
This Comment analyzes the current state of the health
information confidentiality debate, identifying areas of consensus as
well as points of disagreement that must be resolved if Congress is to
enact a comprehensive federal health confidentiality law. Part II
reviews the privacy risks posed by the growing demand for health
information, the reliance on information technology, and the
shortcomings of existing federal and state confidentiality laws.12 Part
7. See infra notes 205-31 and accompanying text. In this Comment, the term
"privacy advocates" and its permutations refer generally to civil liberties, patients' rights,
mental health advocacy, HIV advocacy, and similar organizations. The term "health care
industry" and its permutations refer generally to insurers, information processing
companies, managed care organizations, and other institutional users of information. The
latter term also occasionally encompasses non-health-related users of information, such as
law enforcement, who share industry's desire for a less stringent confidentiality law.
These terms are generalizations and are not intended to represent the views of every
organization. Viewpoints do not necessarily equate with titles. The members of the
American Medical Association ("AMA"), for example, are part of the health care
"industry," but the AMA's position on many confidentiality issues is closely aligned with
that of privacy advocates. See, e.g., Donald J. Palmisano, Testimony on Behalf of the
American Medical Association Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of
the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 46 (Feb. 18, 1997) (unpublished transcript,
on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (arguing for a federal law that does not
preempt more stringent state confidentiality rules).
8. Republican Congressman Christopher Shays of Connecticut, a sponsor of one
health privacy legislative proposal, noted that he was "not prepared for the degree of
complexity and the competing interests" that he found when first looking at this issue.
Medical Privacy Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Management, Info.,
and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. (1998)
[hereinafter Medical Privacy Protection Hearing] (statement of Rep. Christopher Shays),
available in 1998 WL 12760503.
9. See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 205-31 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 16-170 and accompanying text. For a discussion of health and
confidentiality issues generally, see OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, PROTECrING
PRIVACY IN COMPUTERIZED MEDICAL INFORMATION (1993) [hereinafter. OTA];
Lawrence 0. Gostin, Health Information Privacy, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 451 (1995);
Lawrence 0. Gostin et al., Privacy and Security of Health Information in the Emerging
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III discusses previous, unsuccessful efforts to enact a federal health
confidentiality law, as well as recent activity at the federal level
relating to privacy of health information. 3 Part IV focuses on certain
issues that have proven particularly difficult and discusses the often
divergent perspectives of various interested parties. 14 The Comment
concludes with a discussion of several areas in which compromise is
critical for passage of meaningful confidentiality legislation before
the August 1999 deadline.15
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY
A. Sensitivity of Health Information
Of all the kinds of personal information, arguably none is more
sensitive than health-related information. The contents of patient
records held by doctors and other care-givers provide a clear example
of both the breadth and the intimate nature of "health-related
information." A typical patient record contains demographic
information (such as age and race) as well as detailed notes
concerning the patient's history of diseases, treatments, medications,
and diagnostic tests; family history and results from genetic testing; 6
history of substance abuse, mental illness, or violent behavior;
favorite (and dangerous) recreational activities; dietary habits; sexual
orientation, sexual activities, and results from tests for sexually
transmitted disease; employment status and income; and eligibility
for public assistance.17 The contents of the patient record are not
limited, however, to objective test data or information provided by
the patient. Medical records also frequently contain the impressions
of doctors and nurses, including assessments of a patient's character,
personality, and mental state.'8
The vast amount and scope of information held within these
records has led to the suggestion that a medical record contains more
highly personal information than any other single document. 9 While
Health Care System, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 1 (1995); Paul M. Schwartz, The Protection of
Privacy in Health Care Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 295 (1995).
13. See infra notes 171-264 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 265-530 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 531-58 and accompanying text.
16. Genetic information is particularly sensitive because it relates not only to present
medical conditions but also to the propensity of future conditions. See OTA, supra note
12, at 28-29.
17. See id. at 5,27-28; Gostin, supra note 12, at 490.
18. See OTA, supra note 12, at 26,28.
19. See PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMM'N, PERSONAL PRIVACY IN AN
1998]
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this assertion is subjective, undoubtedly the "modern [medical]
record is a warehouse of information."2 The universe of health-
related information is, of course, not limited to patient records held
by doctors and hospitals. Varying amounts of personally identifiable
health data are also held in the records of thousands of other entities,
including employers, insurance companies, government agencies,
credit bureaus, licensing and accreditation organizations, as well as
held by the media.2
No matter the location, the social, psychological, and economic
consequences of the unwanted disclosure of health-related
information can be devastating.22 Disclosure can have significant
public health consequences as well. If individuals fear that their
privacy will not be respected, they are less likely to discuss problems
and risky behaviors candidly with their health care provider, thereby
increasing the risk of misdiagnosis or inadequate care.23
B. The Demand for Health Information
The sensitivity of health information gives rise to a reasonable
expectation among patients that it will be held in confidence.24 This
expectation conflicts, however, with the growing demand for
information by the health care industry-demand fueled largely by
sweeping changes in the way health care is delivered.26 The days of
predominantly freestanding health care providers and insurers are
drawing to a close as the health care industry continues to integrate
itself, shifting toward a managed care model with networks of
providers and payers.27  As the industry has grown more
INFORMATION SOCIETY 282 (1977) [hereinafter PRIVACY COMMISSION].
20. Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in
the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255,258 (1984).
21. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 70-71 (1994) (Report of the Comm. on Gov't
Operations accompanying H.R. 3600); Gostin, supra note 12, at 490.
22. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 490. For some notable examples of the
consequences of unwanted disclosure of health-related information, see OTA, supra note
12, at 27.
23. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 20, at 257.
24. See id.
25. See INSTITUTE OF MED., THE COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD: AN
ESSENTIAL TECHNOLOGY FOR HEALTH CARE 21 (Richard S. Dick & Elaine B. Steen
eds., 1991) [hereinafter COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD].
26. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note 20, at 259-60.
27. See, e.g., Medical Privacy Protection Hearing, supra note 8 (prepared statement of
Charles N. Kahn, III, Chief Executive Officer, Health Insurance Association of America),
available in 1998 WL 12760470; The Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1997:
Hearings on H.R. 52 Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Management, Info., and Tech. of the
House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 20 (1997) [hereinafter
[Vol. 77
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interconnected, the ability to access and share data easily and quickly
has assumed heightened importance. Providers, insurers, and other
entities affiliated with treatment and payment in the modern health
care system use health information for a wide variety of purposes,
including not only the actual delivery of and payment for care but
also disease management programs29  and quality of care
assessments."
The desire to control health care spending is one of the primary
forces behind these changes in the health care industry. Health plans
and health care administrators conduct utilization reviews to
determine how their resources are used, what treatments are most
cost-effective, and how expenditures can be reduced.3' These reviews
frequently involve examinations of significant numbers of personally
identifiable health records. 2 It is now common practice for managed
care organizations, such as health maintenance organizations
("HMOs"), to demand detailed patient information from providers
before approving additional treatment.3  Payers are also
investigating claims for waste and fraud with increasing vigilance. 4
Finally, the federal government's involvement in payment for health
care has added to the demand for patient records 5.3  Like commercial
Hearings on H.R. 52] (statement of Sherine Gabriel on behalf of the Health Care
Leadership Council). One example of the integration movement is Intermountain Health
Care ("IHC"). As of February 1997, IHC operated 23 hospitals and 33 clinics and offered
health insurance plans to more than 350,000 persons in three states. See John T. Nielsen,
Testimony on Behalf of the American Hospital Association Before the Subcomm. on
Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 42 (Feb. 18,
1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Nielsen Testimony].
28. See, e.g., Medical Privacy Protection Hearing, supra note 8 (prepared statement of
Charles N. Kahn, III, Chief Executive Officer, Health Insurance Association of America),
available in 1998 WL 12760470; David L. Larsen, Testimony on Behalf of the American
Association of Health Plans Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the
Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 7-8 (Feb. 3, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Larsen Testimony].
29. For example, many managed care organizations use "care process models" to
determine if clients are at risk for certain conditions and, if so, to ensure they receive
preventive screening. See Larsen Testimony, supra note 28, at 19-20.
30. See id.
31. See COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD, supra note 25, at 21-22.
32. See, e.g., Larsen Testimony, supra note 28, at 7-8.
33. See id. For example, HMOs and health plans routinely interview mental health
providers by phone to ascertain whether a patient really requires treatment, and some
send their own nurses into hospitals to review patient charts. See Craig S. Palosky &
Doug Stanley, Privacy Lost, TAMPA TRIB., Feb. 16,1997, at 1-Nation/World.
34. See Gellman, supra note 20, at 259-60.
35. See id. at 260-61. The Medicare program is the nation's largest third-party payer
for health care treatment and services. See MALCOLM K. SPARROW, LICENSE TO STEAL:
1998]
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third-party payers, the government reviews large numbers of patient
records in an effort to combat waste and fraud in its Medicare and
Medicaid programs. 6 In sum, some level of access to and sharing of
patients' health information is an essential ingredient in the modern
health care system.
Payers and providers are not, however, the only groups who use
personally identifiable health information. The health record has
become such a "rich repository" of valuable information that
organizations not directly involved in delivering or paying for care
also seek its contents. 7 These secondary users include public health
organizations, medical and social science researchers, employers,
government agencies, educational institutions, law enforcement,
credit bureaus, the judicial system, accrediting and licensing
organizations, and the media. Individuals may consent to the use of
their health information by secondary users, but under current law
consent is often not required and, in fact, not obtained.39 Public
health, law enforcement, and other government agencies, for
example, can obtain health information without consent through
means prescribed by law.40  Other secondary users, particularly
private companies, purchase personally identifiable health
information from many willing sellers.41  This "outward flow of
WHY FRAUD PLAGUES AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE SYSTEM at xiii (1996).
36. See Gelman, supra note 20, at 260-61. As of February 1997, approximately 300
Federal Bureau of Investigation agents worked specifically in health care fraud
investigations. See Neil Gallagher, Deputy Assistant Director of the Criminal
Investigative Division, Testimony on Behalf of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and
Health Statistics 22 (Feb. 18, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Gallagher Testimony]. The Bureau had
approximately 2000 health care fraud investigations pending at that time. See id.
37. H.R. REP. NO. 103-601, pt. 5, at 70 (1994).
38. See id. at 70-71 (citing AMERICAN MED. RECORDS ASS'N, CONFIDENTIALITY OF
PATIENT HEALTH INFORMATION: A POSITION STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL RECORDS ASSOCIATION 5-6 (1977), reprinted in Privacy of Medical Records:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong. 326-
27 (1979)). The American Medical Records Association is now known as the American
Health Information Management Association ("AHIMA").
39. See OTA, supra note 12, at 31.
40. For example, law enforcement officials can obtain patient records without
consent if they have a subpoena or search warrant. See infra notes 414-23 and
accompanying text.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, at 71-74 ("[T]here is a demand for health data about
identified individuals and ... there are companies that will collect and sell data to fill that
demand."). Information processing companies, which manage patient information for
providers and payers, are a primary source of the health information available for sale.
See OTA, supra note 12, at 30-31.
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information"42 is widespread, growing, and yet largely unknown to
the average patient.43
For many of these secondary users, personally identifiable health
information is a valuable tool in the decisionmaking processes of
"societal gatekeeping functions."'  Medical information is used to
determine whether an individual will obtain insurance coverage,
receive a marriage license, obtain a driver's license, secure
employment, retain existing employment, or even obtain credit.45
The presence of "negative" information in a health record may affect
the individual's ability to participate in such basic activities.46
Other secondary users obtain health information for the direct
marketing of products and services. Recognizing a "strong
commercial incentive" to collect health information, marketing
companies compile and sell lists of thousands or even millions of
individuals with particular health conditions.47  Pharmaceutical
manufacturers and makers of health and beauty products are
frequent users and purveyors of such lists.4 The commercial appeal
42. OTA, supra note 12, at 44.
43. See Gellman, supra note 20, at 261 ("The value of medical information for uses
outside the medical treatment and payment system has not been popularly recognized,
and even medical professionals are largely unaware of the many uses to which the
information may be put.").
44. PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 281. The phrase "societal gatekeeping
functions" refers to "the use of recorded information to determine whether individuals
should be allowed to enter into different types of social, economic, and political
relationships, and if so, under what circumstances." Id. at 281 n.18.
45. See OTA, supra note 12, at 29-30; PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 281;
Gostin, supra note 12, at 490. The Medical Information Bureau ("MIB") serves as the
"credit bureau" of the life and health insurance industries. MIB maintains medical
history files on approximately 15 million Americans and holds these files for seven years.
More than 700 life and health insurers throughout North America consult these files as
part of the underwriting process. See OTA, supra note 12, at 32-33.
46. See OTA, supra note 12, at 29-30.
47. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 71-74 (1994). For a discussion of privacy
issues and direct marketing, see Kathleen A. Linert, Note, Database Marketing and
Personal Privacy in the Information Age, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 687 (1995).
48. For example, as of 1994, Johnson & Johnson maintained for sale a list of five
million women who suffer from incontinence. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-601, at 73 (citing
The Fair Health Information Practices Act of 1994: Hearings on H.R. 4077 Before the
Subcomm. on Info., Justice, Transp. and Agric. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,
103d Cong. 372 (1994) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4077] (statement of Professor Paul
Schwartz)). Pharmacy chains work with pharmaceutical manufacturers to identify
individuals with particular medical conditions and then market drug therapies to these
individuals. See Palosky & Stanley, supra note 33, at 1-NationlWorld. Following intense
public criticism, CVS drug stores and Giant Food grocery stores recently abandoned such
programs. See Chris Reidy, CVS Hit with Class-Action Suit over Mailings, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 26, 1998, at C1. CVS and Giant shared lists of customers with Elensys, Inc.,
which mailed letters tailored to particular medical conditions--the cost of which was
1998]
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of health-related information is so strong that even organizations that
might otherwise be considered "pro-patient" traffic in it.49 Under
current law, these activities are often legal.5"
C. Impact of Computerization on Privacy
Concurrent with the integration of treatment and payment and
the increasing demand for information is a growing reliance on
technology, which the health care industry views as a means for
improving the delivery of care while reducing costs.51 Central to this
effort is a movement toward computerized medical records and the
automated storage and transfer of personal health information.
Although most health information is still recorded on paper,53 the
shift to computer-based information systems is well under way.5 4 The
health care industry envisions a future of computerized records in
which each individual will have a single, paperless record containing
all of his health-related information accumulated from birth until
death. 5 This longitudinal record will be stored in databases and
shared with authorized users through health data networks linking
providers, hospitals, health plans, and other entities.56 These
underwritten by pharmaceutical manufacturers such as Glaxo Wellcome--to the
customers encouraging them to purchase medications manufactured by those companies.
See id.
49. See Palosky & Stanley, supra note 33, at 1-Nation/World (describing a magazine
published for HIV-positive persons that rents its subscription list to direct marketers).
50. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, at 72-74; OTA, supra note 12, at 31.
51. See, e.g., Nielsen Testimony, supra note 27, at 42-43.
52. See, e.g., OTA, supra note 12, at 6-11.
53. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 457.
54. Several examples illustrate how technology is already used in the storage and
movement of health-related information. Of the 3.5 billion health care payment claims
processed in 1994, 1.3 billion (36%) were transmitted electronically. See Medical Records
Confidentiality Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 1360 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources, 104th Cong. 107 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 1360] (statement
of the Association for Electronic Health Care Transactions). Revco Drug Stores,
operating in 17 states, electronically links its stores with corporate headquarters and with
third-party payers to facilitate filling prescriptions. See Robert Thompson, Prepared
Statement on Behalf of the National Association of Chain Drug Stores Before the
Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health
Statistics 1-2 (Feb. 4, 1997) (unpublished statement, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter Thompson Statement]. Revco maintains a centralized database of
records so that any of its pharmacists can pull up a customer's medication history. See id.
Similarly, information technology companies are developing computerized network
systems for managed care organizations and health data networks for entire communities.
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 325-26 (statement of Dr. Richard
Barker, International Business Machines ("IBM")).
55. See COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT REcORD, supra note 25, at 44.
56. See id. at 51-52.
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electronic linkages will collectively form a national "health
information infrastructure," facilitating the seamless transfer of
patient information among data users.
Computerization of health information purportedly offers
several advantages over a paper-based information system, including
enhanced administrative efficiency," more effective outcome and
cost assessment, and improved delivery of care.5 9 Commonly cited
examples of improvements in care include the ability of any
emergency room to access crucial patient history information
instantly," a reduction in tests that patients must repeat because past
results cannot be located,61 and the ability of doctors practicing in a
managed care network to share patient information.62 Another oft-
cited advantage is the enhanced security that computerization can
provide for health-related information such as patient records. 3
Unlike paper-based record systems, computerized systems include
controls designed to limit access to authorized persons and to record
the electronic movements of these persons when reviewing patient
records; although not foolproof, these security features can reduce
57. See id. at 50-54; OTA, supra note 12, at 6-10. Congress has stated its support for
the development of a national health information infrastructure. See Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d, Historical and Statutory
Notes (West Supp. 1998) (Purpose of Administrative Simplification). In addition to
facilitating the movement of traditional patient records, advances in technology have
furthered the practice of telemedicine. For a discussion of privacy concerns related to
telemedicine, see Christina M. Rackett, Note, Telemedicine Today and Tomorrow: Why
"Virtual" Privacy Is Not Enough, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 167 (1997).
58. Administrative expenses, primarily paper-based claims processing, account for
approximately 19-24% of health care expenditures. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 480
(citing Steffie Woolhander & David U. Himmelstein, The Deteriorating Administrative
Efficiency of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEW ENG. J. IED. 1253, 1255-56 (1991)).
Some commentators believe that computerization will result in cost savings. See, e.g.,
Schwartz, supra note 12, at 305 ("Information technology may offer the last best hope to
control health care costs. It renders accessible to external observation and supervision
the enormous amount of data involved in diagnosing, treating, and billing patients. The
potential cost savings from greater use of data processing in health care are enormous.").
But see SPARROW, supra note 35, at 122-40 (arguing that any cost savings achieved by
computerization will be offset by a corresponding increase in fraudulent claims for
treatment).
59. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 305-06. For a more complete discussion of the
reasons advanced for the computerization of health information, see COMPUTER-BAsED
PATIENT RECORD, supra note 25, at 2-3, 24-26; OTA, supra note 12, at 6-11; Gostin,
supra note 12, at 470-84.
60. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 477.
61. See Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 78 (statement of AHIMA).
62. See, e.g., Larsen Testimony, supra note 28, at 8.
63. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 492.
1998]
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the risk of unauthorized access to information.r4
While computerization may offer significant advantages, it also
poses a threat to individuals' privacy.65 Computerization facilitates
the creation of networks connecting large databases containing
health-related information on thousands or even millions of
persons.6 These networks allow potentially large numbers of
authorized users to access these data from multiple locations,
reducing the individual's ability to control the flow of her health-
related information.67 Computers may also allow these users to link
data sets intended to remain separated, so that otherwise non-
identifiable information may be combined to identify an individual.0
Furthermore, no electronic safeguard can absolutely guarantee that
computerized data will not be stolen or altered.6 9  Finally, many
observers believe that the ease with which computers permit transfer
and analyses will only fuel the already insatiable demand for health-
64. See OTA, supra note 12, at 11-12. Access may be controlled through the use of
passwords and user-specific menus that authorize users to see only those parts of the
patient record they have a legitimate reason to see. See id. at 11. Audit trails can track
the electronic movements of users to reveal patterns of improper behavior on the system.
See id. But see infra text accompanying note 69 (noting that such safeguards are not
foolproof).
65. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 493.
66. Thousands of computerized databases containing health-related information
already exist, some of them quite large. For example, the Medical Information Bureau
maintains such a database. See supra note 45 for background on MIB. The MIB
database likely pales in comparison, however, with the U.S. Medicare claim
reimbursement system, which may constitute "the largest collection of health databases in
the world" storing vast amounts of personally identifiable information. WILLIAM W.
LOWRANCE, PRIVACY AND HEALTH RESEARCH: A REPORT TO THE U.S. SECRETARY
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvIcES 19 (1997). For a more complete discussion of the
variety of public and private health databases in existence, see Gostin, supra note 12, at
463-69.
67. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 492-93. Commentators generally agree that access
by authorized individuals-not outside "hackers"-poses the greatest threat to the
security of health information. See OTA, supra note 12, at 11-12. Ease of access is,
however, one of the principal arguments for computerization. See Gostin, supra note 12,
at 493. The list of users who would likely have access to computerized patient records is
very large, see COMPUTER-BASED PATIENT RECORD, supra note 25, at 31-33, thus
increasing the likelihood that patient information will be given or sold to unauthorized
parties, see Gostin, supra note 12, at 488.
68. See OTA, supra note 12, at 37. In some information storage schemes, health-
related records are stripped of all identifying data (e.g., name, address, social security
number), and these data are stored separately. The purpose of this system is to prevent
users from determining the identity of any record subject. In a computerized
environment, the possibility exists that a sophisticated user, authorized or otherwise,
could link the two sets of data to produce personally identifiable information. See Gostin,
supra note 12, at 494.




In sum, the demand for health-related information and the
concurrent reliance on technology pose a significant policy dilemma.
Accurate and timely information is a necessary component of a well-
functioning health care system. 71  Computerization promises to
facilitate the flow of data among care-givers, payers, and others and
to reduce the cost of transfer and storage of such data.7 2 The
availability of this information allows providers to deliver
appropriate care and permits the study of best practices, cost analysis,
and other benefits.73 At the same time, however, the demand for
information by so many parties and the ease with which
computerization allows these parties to obtain this information
necessarily result in a reduction of personal privacy.74 The potentially
harmful social and economic consequences of this intrusion mean
that society must strike a balance between competing health care and
privacy interests.75
D. Current Legal Protections for Confidentiality of Health
Information
Unfortunately, our nation has been unable to strike such a
balance. Neither statutory nor case law at the federal or state levels
offers significant, comprehensive protection for the privacy of all
health-related information.76 This glaring omission is compounded
by the failure of many of these laws to keep pace with advances in
technology; existing laws are often based on increasingly antiquated
notions of a paper-based health information system. 77 A review of
the current legal framework reveals that our health-related
information receives inconsistent protection that does not take into
account changes in the health care industry, the growing secondary
use of health information, or the impact of computerization.78
70. See id. at 18.
71. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 451-52.
72. See supra notes 51-64 and accompanying text.
73. See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
74. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 489.
75. See id. at 515-16; see also Protecting Our Personal Health Information: Privacy in
the Electronic Age: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources,
105th Cong. 6 (1997) [hereinafter Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings] (statement of
Donna Shalala, Secretary of HHS) (noting that privacy principles should be "weighed
against... our public responsibility to support national priorities, public health, research,
quality care, and our fight against health care fraud and abuse").
76. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 12, at 310.
77. See, e.g., OTA, supra note 12, at 15.
78. See infra Part II.D.1-3.
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1. Statutory Protections at the Federal Level
Unlike its European counterparts, the United States has
developed a piecemeal approach to information privacy protection.79
No overarching federal law protects the privacy of information;
rather, Congress has enacted privacy laws on an ad hoc basis.8" This
approach has led to separate federal privacy laws governing the
collection, use, and disclosure of credit information,8" financial
records,8 student records, 83 cable television subscriber information,
84
and video rental records.85 Information concerning individuals
treated in federally funded or regulated drug and alcohol dependency
programs also receives protection.86 To the extent that health-related
information is included in any of these sources, it receives some form
of federal protection. No comprehensive federal law exists, however,
for the protection of all health-related information regardless of its
source.87
Even the most comprehensive federal privacy law, the Privacy
Act of 1974,8 offers limited protection for health information. The
Act governs the collection, use, and dissemination of information
maintained only by federal government agencies and other
institutions operated by the federal government or pursuant to
federal contract.8 9 Most health-related information, however, is held
by private entities who are not covered by the Act.0 The Act is also
79. See Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S.
Private Sector, 80 IowA L. REV. 497, 500 (1995). The members of the European Union
have agreed to a comprehensive scheme designed to protect the privacy of all personal
data regardless of subject matter. See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
80. See Reidenberg, supra note 79, at 500.
81. See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970,15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
82 See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978,12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422 (1994).
83. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974,20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1994).
84. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,47 U.S.C. § 551 (1994).
85. See Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994). This act was
passed in response to the release of Judge Robert H. Bork's video rental record during
hearings concerning his nomination for the Supreme Court. See House OKs Video
Privacy Protection Bill, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 1988, pt. I, at 2.
86. See 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994).
87. See Robert M. Gellman, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National
Level? Thoughts on the Possible Need for International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REV.
129, 136 (1996). That video rental records receive more protection at the federal level
than health-related information is frequently noted by those who question the current
state of affairs. See, e.g., Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 4
(statement of Donna Shalala, Secretary of HHS).
88. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994).
89. See id. § 552a(a)(1), (m)(1); OTA, supra note 12, at 42.
90. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 315.
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fiddled with exceptions. 91 For example, while federal agencies are
generally obligated to obtain consent before disclosing personally
identifiable information, at least twelve exceptions to this
requirement exist,92 most notably an exception for "routine use"
disclosures.93 Federal agencies have interpreted the routine use
exception so broadly that individuals are effectively unable to control
the flow of information through the power of consent.94 And, like so
many other privacy laws, the Act has not kept pace with technology;
designed for a world of paper-based information systems, it does not
contemplate databases of millions of records instantaneously
accessible from remote locations.95 While its purpose and provisions
were at the vanguard of privacy protection at its inception, the
Privacy Act has recently been labeled one of the "most outdated"
national privacy laws in the world.96
2. Constitutional Right to Privacy
Whatever right to privacy the U.S. Constitution guarantees has
also been of limited benefit to the protection of health information. 7
Like the Privacy Act, the right to privacy under the Constitution
91. See id. at 318.
92. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
93. Id. § 552a(b)(3). The Act defines "routine use" as "the use of [a] record for a
purpose which is compatible with the purpose for which it was collected." Id.
§ 552a(a)(7).
94. See OTA, supra note 12, at 41 n.39. For examples, as well as a critical review, of
agencies' broad interpretation of the routine use exemption, see Todd Robert Coles,
Comment, Does the Privacy Act of 1974 Protect Your Right to Privacy? An Examination
of the Routine Use Exemption, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 957, 978-90 (1991).
95. See OTA, supra note 12, at 79.
96. Gellman, supra note 87, at 134.
97. While the Constitution does not explicitly confer a right to privacy, the Supreme
Court has recognized an implied right that protects from government intrusion an
individual's interest in both autonomous decisionmaking and "avoiding disclosure of
personal matters." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). The Court has relied on
the former interest to protect individuals' decisions regarding, among other things, child
rearing, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-45 (1925), procreation, see
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), contraception, see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965), marriage, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967), and abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973). The parameters of
the right to privacy, however, are not clear, see United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980) (noting that the "full measure of the constitutional
protection of the right to privacy has not yet been delineated"), and commentators
frequently debate its limits, see Gostin, supra note 12, at 495. For a brief discussion of the
development of the right to privacy, see OTA, supra note 12, at 39-40. For a discussion of
the right to informational privacy specifically, see Bruce W. Clark, Note, The
Constitutional Right to Confidentiality, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 133 (1982).
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offers protection only from intrusions by the government.9" Because
most health-related data are maintained by non-governmental
entities, constitutional remedies are not available to individuals
whose privacy is breached by private data-holders. 99 Furthermore,
even when the information in question is held by a government
agency, an examination of applicable case law indicates that an
individual's ability to seek recourse under a constitutional right to
informational privacy is limited.100
The most well-known health information privacy case, Whalen v.
Roe, ' also marked the beginning of the Supreme Court's
articulation of a right to privacy in personal information.' In
Whalen, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a New York
statute directing physicians to notify the state when certain drugs
were prescribed and requiring the state to store this individually
identifiable information for a number of years. 03 The Court stated
that the right to privacy encompasses two interests, an interest in
individual autonomy and an interest in "avoiding disclosure of
personal matters."" °  Despite the existence of these interests, and
despite a recognition of a threat to privacy posed by computer
databanks, the Court held that the statute did not violate any
protected right to privacy.0  The Court thought particularly
persuasive the physical, technological, and organizational safeguards
implemented by the state to protect the prescription information, and
stated that these measures indicated sufficient concern for protecting
the right to privacy."' It also noted that the right to privacy in
information is not absolute but is subject to countervailing public
interests.' ° Consequently, the Court concluded that the disclosure of
information to government officials charged with protecting a
98. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 314-15.
99. See id.
100. See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
101. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
102. See Schwartz, supra note 12, at 315.
103. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 591-95.
104. Id. at 599. One commentator has noted that the Whalen decision "does little to
ensure that future courts will hold health officials to exacting constitutional standards to
protect privacy." Gostin, supra note 12, at 496. For critical analyses of the Whalen
decision, see Schwartz, supra note 12, at 315-17; Terri Finkbine Arnold, Note, Let
Technology Counteract Technology: Protecting the Medical Record in the Computer Age,
15 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 455, 481-83, 489-90 (1993); Clark, supra note 97, at 133-
38; Wendy Parmet, Note, Public Health Protection and the Privacy of Medical Records, 16
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 265,294-98 (1981).
105. See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602-06.
106. See id. at 592-95, 605.
107. See id. at 602.
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community's 'health does not necessarily constitute a violation of
constitutional protections.10 8
Subsequent federal courts have also decided in favor of the
public interest. In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,'09 the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that demands for access
to Westinghouse's employee medical records by the National
Institute for Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") did not
violate the employees' constitutional right to privacy." 0 The court
recognized that the constitutional right to privacy applied because
the employee medical records fell within the Whalen-defined interest
of avoiding disclosure by the government of personal information."'
It noted, however, that "the right of an individual to control access to
her or his medical history is not absolute" and that "public health or
other public concerns may support access to facts an individual might
otherwise choose to withhold.""' Applying a seven-point balancing
test,"' the court held that the public interest advanced by NIOSH's
investigation into working conditions at the Westinghouse plant
justified the "minimal intrusion" into the privacy of the employees'
medical information."4
Fifteen years later, the Third Circuit reached a similar result in
Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority
("SEPTA")."5 SEPTA, a self-insured public employer, learned of
employee Doe's HIV-positive status when performing a cost-
assessment review of records maintained by the administrator of its
108. See id. The Court drew an analogy to state laws requiring the reporting of
"injuries caused by deadly weapons" and suspected incidents of child abuse. Id. at 602
n.29.
109. 638 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1980).
110. See id. at 580-81.
111. See id. at 577.
112. Id. at 578.
113. The Westinghouse Court enunciated seven factors to consider when undertaking
this balancing process: (1) the kind of record the government wishes to obtain; (2) the
kind of information this record does or might contain; (3) the harm that may occur if this
information is subsequently disclosed without consent; (4) the injury that may occur to the
relationship that produced the record because of this disclosure; (5) the adequacy of
measures designed to prevent unauthorized subsequent disclosure; (6) the degree of need
for obtaining the information; and (7) whether there exists a statutory mandate or other
clear public interest favoring access to the information. See id.
114. Id. at 580. The court did hold that employees were entitled to prior notice of the
disclosure. See id. at 580-81.
115. 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995). For further analysis of SEPTA, see Kar C.
Kwiatkowski, Extension of the Right to Privacy to Medical Prescription Information: Doe
v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 38 B.C. L. REV. 433 (1997).
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employee prescription drug program."6 Applying the Westinghouse
balancing test, the court held that SEPTA had not violated Doe's
constitutional right to privacy in his prescription drug records. 17 The
court recognized a "strong public interest ... in [SEPTA] ...
containing its costs and expenses by permitting this sort of research"
and reasoned that this interest outweighed the "minimal" intrusion
into Doe's privacy. 18
Aside from public interest concerns, the constitutional right to
privacy in health information is likely circumscribed in an additional
way. In United States v. Miller,"9 the Supreme Court held that an
individual's right to privacy in his financial records did not apply to
information held about that individual by a third party. 2° Although
Miller has since been superseded by the Right to Financial Privacy
Act of 1978, some commentators believe a similar outcome would
result if an analogous case involving health information came before
the Court."z Such a decision would likely mean that patients would
not have standing to contest the constitutional validity of efforts by
the government to access health information held about them by
hospitals, doctors, and other third parties."z
These decisions demonstrate that the constitutional right to
privacy does not adequately address the full range of issues related to
the privacy of health information. 24 Individuals cannot rely on
constitutional rights to protect their privacy because the courts are
likely to determine that countervailing public interests justify access
to information by the government.125 As long as this trend continues,
legislation and administrative regulations will be more preferable
mechanisms through which to create strong health privacy
116. See SEPTA, 72 F.3d at 1135-36.
117. See id. at 1140.
118. Id.
119. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
120. See id. at 443.
121. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
122. See H.R. REP. NO. 103-601, pt. 5, at 69 (1994) (expressing the Committee's belief
that "there is a substantial risk that Miller would be applied to health records"); see also
Gellman, supra note 20, at 290-91 (describing the likelihood of a similar outcome as
"real" and noting that "[a]s a practical matter, in the absence of a statute or a definitive
court decision, the Miller decision is effectively being applied when medical records are
subpoenaed").
123. See Gellman, supra note 20, at 290-91.
124. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 498.
125. See id. at 497 ("Provided the government articulates a valid societal purpose and
employs reasonable security measures, courts have not interfered with traditional




3. Health Information Privacy Protections at the State Level
The absence of meaningful federal statutes and the unwillingness
or inability of federal courts to provide strong constitutional
safeguards mean that the task of protecting health information has
fallen on the states.127 A majority of states provide some measure of
confidentiality protection for health-related data through the
common law."2 For example, breach of fiduciary duty,'129 breach of
implied contract,' 30  invasion of privacy,'3 ' and breach of
confidentiality 32 have served as causes of action for individuals
seeking private redress for the nonconsensual, extrajudicial
disclosure of health information. Largely by default, these causes of
action probably provide the "most consistent safeguards" for the
confidentiality of health information. 33
The common law approach, however, is not without limitation.
For instance, certain duties-notably a duty of confidentiality-
normally apply only to those in a fiduciary relationship with the
patient-usually doctorsY4  Insurers and most secondary users
normally do not owe fiduciary duties to patients and, therefore, are
not subject to these common law causes of action. 35 Unless the state
126. See id. But see Parmet, supra note 104, at 294 (arguing that the legislative
approach is disfavored because "the legislature remains free to create numerous
[statutory] exceptions" and that "[c]onstitutional doctrines must be utilized to attack the
deficiencies of this legislative solution").
127. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 498.
128. See id. at 508.
129. See, e.g., Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824,829-30 (Ala. 1973).
130. See, e.g., Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 801 (N.D. Ohio
1965).
131. See, e.g., Home, 287 So. 2d at 830-31. Two torts based on a right to privacy are
particularly relevant-unreasonable intrusion of privacy and public disclosure of private
facts. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117,
at 854-59 (5th ed. 1984). To state a cause of action for the former, one must show
intentional interference with one's interest in "solitude or seclusion." Id at 854.
Publication of the information obtained is not an element of the tort. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D.D.C. 1981) (citing Pearson v.
Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 704 (D.C. Cir. 1969)). The latter generally requires a showing of
public disclosure of private facts that "would be highly offensive and objectionable to a
reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities." KEETON ET AL., supra, at 856-57; see also
infra note 139 (describing a possible limitation on the use of public disclosure of private
facts as a cause of action).
132 See, e.g., Humphers v. First Interstate Bank, 696 P.2d 527, 533-36 (Or. 1985) (en
banc).
133. Gostin, supra note 12, at 510.
134. See id. at 510-11.
135. See id. at 510 (citing Hague v. Williams, 181 A.2d 345,349 (N.J. 1962)).
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has enacted such a duty by statute,'36 individuals frequently have no
legal recourse against insurers, private businesses, and others who
disseminate health information without consent.137 This limitation is
particularly significant because the redisclosure of information by
secondary users is considered one of the principal threats to health
information privacy. 38 Furthermore, several commentators have
suggested that torts based on the right to privacy are strictly
circumscribed and difficult to apply to situations involving the
disclosure of health information.
39
Each state has augmented its common law protections with
statutes concerning the confidentiality of health information, but very
few states have comprehensive statutory protections. 4 °  Like
Congress, state legislatures have enacted privacy laws in piecemeal
fashion. 4' The result of this ad hoc approach has been a proliferation
of laws pertaining directly or indirectly to the confidentiality of
health information. A 1979 survey of health information
confidentiality laws found, for example, that the number of statutes
ranged from seven in Vermont to thirty-nine in Hawaii. 42 The
results of a 1996 survey of state confidentiality laws indicate that
proliferation has continued unabated.
43
136. Only a small minority of states have enacted confidentiality statutes that apply to
entities unaffiliated with the delivery of care. See infra note 480 and accompanying text.
137. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 508-12.
138. See supra notes 37-50 and accompanying text.
139. The tort of disclosure of private facts has traditionally required a showing of
public disclosure. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 131, at 856-57. To satisfy the public
disclosure requirement, a plaintiff generally must show that the information about him
was communicated to the public at large, not just to one person or several persons. See,
e.g., Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 11 (5th Cir. 1962)
(construing Florida laws to require communication to the -'public in general" or to a
"large number of persons as distinguished from one individual or a few"); Vogel v. W.T.
Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133, 137-38 (Pa. 1974) (holding that disclosure of one plaintiff's poor
credit record to four persons did not satisfy the publication requirement for a disclosure
of a private facts cause of action). Because many misuses of health data do not involve
such widespread disclosure, this cause of action might be unavailable. See Gostin, supra
note 12, at 509 n.291; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 321-22.
140. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 506. California enacted one of the most
comprehensive health information confidentiality statutes in 1981. See CAL. CIV. CODE
§§ 56.05-.37 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998).
141. See, e.g., William J. Fenrich, Note, Common Law Protection of Individuals' Rights
in Personal Information, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 951, 970 (1996) (citing Joel R.
Reidenberg, Privacy in the Information Economy: A Fortress or Frontier for Individual
Rights?, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 195,205,208-09 (1992)).
142. See Gellman, supra note 87, at 136 n.33 (citing NATIONAL COMM'N ON
CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH RECORDS, HEALTH REcoRDs CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS
IN THE STATES 17-19, 54 (1979)).
143. See LAWRENCE 0. GOSTIN ET AL., LEGISLATIVE SURVEY OF STATE
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One significant finding of the 1996 survey is the degree to which
statutory protections for health information can vary within a state.
Because of state legislatures' piecemeal approach to privacy,
different levels of confidentiality protection may apply depending on
the kind of data involved and the identity of its custodian.' Many
states have enacted, for example, disease-specific statutes addressing
the use and dissemination of information related to mental illness,
genetic testing, HIV infection, and other conditions deemed
particularly sensitive. 4 5 These statutes typically confer a higher
degree of confidentiality protection than other statutes pertaining to
health information generally.
46
The survey also reconfirmed that states differ greatly in the level
of confidentiality protection they provide to health information. It
found, for example, that every state has statutes that directly or
indirectly concern HIV-related information, but that these statutes
"vary considerably" in how stringently they protect the
information. 47 Massachusetts law, for example, prohibits virtually
without exception the disclosure of HIV test results without the
written consent of the individual.'" Statutes in New York and
California, on the other hand, each list more than a dozen exceptions
to their consent requirements. 49  The survey noted significant
discrepancies among the states concerning other kinds of
confidentiality statutes as well. Thirty-seven states impose a
statutory duty of confidentiality on doctors, but only twenty-six
impose this duty on other health care providers, and only nine extend
it to institutions not affiliated with the delivery of care, such as
employers.' 0
States that do impose a duty of confidentiality frequently require
consent to disclose information concerning a patient.' These states
differ, however, in their approach to the consent process. The survey
found that California has detailed requirements concerning consent
CONFIDENTIALITY LAWS, WITH SPECIFIC EMPHASIS ON HIV AND IMMUNIZATION
(REPORT TO THE U.S. CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL ET AL.) (1996).
144. See id. at 40, 43.
145. See id. at 43.
146. See id. at 43, 156.
147. Id. at 65, 77.
148. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 111, § 70F (Law. Co-op. 1995 & Supp. 1998); GOSTIN
ET AL., supra note 143, at 78.
149. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2782 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998); GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 78, 80.
150. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 48-51.
151. See id. at 54-55.
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forms,5 2 while some states do not even require that consent be given
in writing.' Statutorily defined exceptions to the consent
requirement vary as well. Sixteen states permit the nonconsensual
disclosure of personally identifiable information to epidemiologists
and other researchers, for example, but only eighteen states provide
for such disclosure to other health care providers. 4
Consent arguably has little meaning if patients are unaware of
the contents of the information they permit to be disclosed. 55 While
some states confer on individuals the right to inspect and copy health
information held about them, as of February 1998, twenty-two states
did not. 6 Where a right of access exists, its scope varies, with some
states guaranteeing the right to inspect both hospital and physician
records and other states securing a right to inspect hospital records
only.
157
States also differ significantly in their approach to the increasing
role of computerization in health care information systems.
According to the 1996 survey, twenty-two states have statutes with
provisions governing the confidentiality of data in computerized
format.58 Other states merely attempt to apply statutes written in an
era of paper-based information systems to computerized data.1 9
Aware of the privacy concerns raised by computerization, a few
states have even enacted so-called "quill-pen" statutes, which require
health information to be maintained in paper format only. 60
The result of this boggling array of state confidentiality laws is,
as one commentator put it, "a legal, political and practical mess" 161
that has been widely criticized. 6 Notably, individuals receive
152. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 56.11 (West 1982).
153. See GOsTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 55.
154. See id. at 54.
155. See OTA, supra note 12, at 70; PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 289;
SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CONFIDENTIALITY OF INDIVIDUALLY-
IDENTIFIABLE HEALTH INFORMATION: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 34 (1997) [hereinafter HHS RECOMMENDATIONS] ("A
patient's decision whether to disclose a record may depend on what the record says, and
so access to the record is integral to making an informed choice to disclose information.").
156. See Health Care Information Confidentiality: Hearing on S. 1368 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 8 (1998) [hereinafter
Hearing on S. 1368] (statement of AHIMA).
157. See id.
158. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 51.
159. See id. at 57.
160. See Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 222.
161. Gellman, supra note 87, at 137.
162 See, e.g., INSTITUTE OF MED., HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE 151-52
(Molla S. Donaldson & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1994) [hereinafter HEALTH DATA IN THE
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inconsistent levels of confidentiality safeguards for their health
information; the degree of confidentiality depends on the subject of
the data, the identity of the data-holder, and the state in which the
data are held. 6' The current system of state laws also fails to
recognize fundamental changes that have occurred in the way care is
delivered and the means by which information is managed. As the
health care industry continues its process of integration, institutions
and provider networks have grown in size." With computers
replacing paper as the means of managing information, providers and
other entities in the industry have been able to expand their
operations without regard to geography.165 Institutions with multi-
state operations are forced to comply with a unique set of laws for
each state, creating substantial administrative and financial
burdens. 66 Multiple legal standards apply as data flow across state
lines even in a single electronic transaction, 67 and in the event of
litigation concerning that transaction, users of data face substantial
uncertainty as to which state has jurisdiction. 6 ' Attempting to
comply with the inconsistent laws breeds confusion, increasing the
risk that data will be disclosed in violation of some law.'69
Furthermore, most state confidentiality obligations apply to specific
users of information, ignoring the reality of data sharing among many
different entities. 70 The end result is that those who use and share
information are uncertain of their legal obligations, and individuals
are unsure of their legal rights as information passes from state to
INFORMATION AGE]; OTA, supra note 12, at 15; Gostin, supra note 12, at 516; Schwartz,
supra note 12, at 310, 320; see also infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text (describing
widespread support for a comprehensive federal health confidentiality law).
163. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 155-57.
164. See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
165. See Gellman, supra note 87, at 138-39.
166. See, e.g., Thompson Statement, supra note 54, at 4 (noting that Revco Drug
Stores has had to develop a computer system that conforms to the separate confidentiality
requirements of the 17 states in which it operates). But see Steven Kenny Hoge,
Testimony on Behalf of the American Psychiatric Association Before the Subcomm. on
Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 51 (Feb. 18,
1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Hoge Testimony] (arguing that the administrative and financial burdens are not unlike
those experienced by any interstate business).
167. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 107 (statement of the Association for
Electronic Health Care Transactions).
168. See HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 162, at 151.
169. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 155-57.
170. See id. at 58, 157. For a description of the various entities that might handle
identifiable patient data in a single electronic transaction between provider and payer, see
Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 107 (statement of the Association for Electronic
Health Care Transactions).
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state and from user to user.
III. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR THE CURRENT DEBATE
A. A Uniform State Approach?
It is widely acknowledged that the current system of federal and
state laws neither adequately protects patients' privacy nor facilitates
the delivery of high-quality, cost-efficient care.1 71 As demonstrated in
Part II, the continuing integration of the health care industry and the
increasing reliance on electronic data transactions mean that these
problems will continue. In a 1993 report to Congress, the Office of
Technology Assessment warned that unless a new approach is taken,
health confidentiality issues will increasingly be resolved in the
legislatures and the courts of the individual states, which will only
exacerbate the problems already presented by the system of fifty sets
of laws.172
One alternative approach, recommended by the Privacy
Protection Study Commission in 1977, would have the fifty states
enact a uniform law for the confidentiality of health information.
73
In 1985, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws proposed model legislation for such a uniform law.74 At
this time, only two states, Montana and Washington, have adopted
sections of the Uniform Health Care Information Act ("UHCIA").1'
Like existing state statutes, the UHCIA does not fully reflect the
realities of the modern health care industry. Although the UHCIA
applies to both paper- and computer-based information systems, its
provisions apply only to providers in a relationship with the patient
and not to other users of data such as claims processors and third-
party payers. 76 Uniform legislation under consideration by the
171. See, e.g., HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra. note 162, at 151-52;
OTA, supra note 12, at 15; Schwartz, supra note 12, at 310, 320. But see Hoge Testimony,
supra note 166, at 47-50 (arguing that while additional protections are needed for data
maintained by secondary users, additional statutory restrictions on providers are
unnecessary because the existence of breach of confidentiality claims already provides
effective protection for patients' privacy).
172 See OTA, supra note 12, at 20.
173. See PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 293-94.
174. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE INFORMATION ACT, 9 U.L.A. 475 (1988).
175. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-16-501 to -533 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.02.005 to -.904 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
176. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE INFORMATION ACT §§ 2-101 to 7-102, 9 U.L.A. 485-
514; see also Gelman, supra note 87, at 136 n.32 ("Having been proposed before the era
of health maintenance organizations, ... health database organizations and computer
networks, the uniform act is now out-of-date."). The UHCIA is quite explicit in its
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National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC")177
would, on the other hand, impose confidentiality requirements on
insurers and entities authorized to assume risk, but not on providers
and other users of health data. 78
Even a comprehensive proposal cannot, however, overcome a
uniform law's principal drawback: Assuming that all fifty legislatures
could pass some form of model legislation in a timely manner,
discrepancies in the protection and management of information
would remain to the extent that states adopt only certain sections or
alter the uniform law's recommendations.179 The likelihood that all
fifty legislatures would enact the proposed model legislation without
some material change is doubtful.18 The result would not satisfy the
need for a high degree of uniformity in confidentiality
requirements-a necessity for both the health care industry, which
increasingly operates across state lines, and patients, whose sensitive
health information deserves strong protection regardless of
location. 8 1 For this reason, a uniform confidentiality law at the state
level is not the most promising solution to an urgent problem.
B. The Call for Federal Action
The idea of a comprehensive federal law that provides strong
confidentiality protection for health information and clear guidelines
for its use has gained popularity in recent years.tm  As the
rejection of a comprehensive approach, noting that the relationship between non-provider
and patient differs from that of the doctor-patient relationship and that Congress and the
states are addressing the confidentiality of health data held by non-providers through
specific statutes. See UNiF. HEALTH-CARE INFORMATION ACr § 1-101 cmt., 9 U.L.A.
480-81. According to the UHCIA, the latter argument "indicate[s] as an empirical matter
that a health-care information statute should not cover... nonhealth-care providers." Id.
at 481.
177. See NAIC, Health Information Privacy Model Act (Draft of July 2, 1998). If
adopted by NAIC, the proposed draft will replace NAIC's current model health
confidentiality law.
178. See id. § 3. The proposal would apply to "entit[ies] required to be licensed or
authorized by the [state insurance] commissioner to assume risk, including but not limited
to an insurer, a hospital, medical or health service corporation, a health maintenance
organization, a provider sponsored organization, ... [or] a self-insured group fund." Id.
NAIC proposes that states enact additional confidentiality laws to cover data holders who
fall outside the jurisdiction of insurance commissioners. See id. § 3(A) note.
179. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 161-62 ("Enactment of a Uniform Act
requires legislative or public initiatives in each of the ... fifty states.... Even after
universal adoption, variability could persist if some states opt to impose stricter standards
for privacy protection than those in the model statute.").
180. See HEALTH DATA IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 162, at 182.
181. See supra notes 162-70 and accompanying text.
182 See, e.g., OTA, supra note 12, at 44; Gostin, supra note 12, at 456, 527; Roger E.
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inadequacies of the current system of state laws have become
apparent, support for federal health information confidentiality
legislation has increased. This support is broad-based, involving a
diverse range of organizations with various interests, including
privacy advocacy groups, information processing companies, doctors,
and health plans.183 These groups have found common ground in the
need for a comprehensive federal statute because "no one benefit[s]
from the existing diversity and inconsistency" in confidentiality
laws. 84 Although support may not be universal, it has sufficiently
advanced to the point that the need for a comprehensive federal
statute is no longer seriously debated."8 5
The basic building blocks of a federal health confidentiality law
are not in dispute. 86 In a 1973 report, the U.S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare recommended five "fair
information" principles that should form the basis of confidentiality
guidelines for any kind of data: (1) no data system should be
Harris, Note, The Need to Know Versus the Right to Know: Privacy of Patient Medical
Data in an Information-Based Society, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1183, 1217 (1997). The
constitutional basis for a federal law is rooted in the Commerce Clause. See H.R. REP.
No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 83 (1994) (citing findings enumerated in the Fair Health
Information Practices Act, H.R. 4077, 103d Cong. (1994)); Gellman, supra note 87, at 139
("Today, there are few, if any, participants in health care treatment or payment activities
who do not operate in interstate commerce.").
183. This diversity is illustrated by the participants at a 1993 conference on health
information issues who expressed support for federal legislation: CIGNA Health Care,
IBM, the American Medical Association, Computer Professionals for Social
Responsibility, and the U.S. Public Interest Research Group. See Hearings on S. 1360,
supra note 54, at 63 (statement of the Center for Democracy and Technology).
184. Gellman, supra note 87, at 140.
185. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM. ON VITAL AND HEALTH STATIsTICS, HEALTH
PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (1997) [hereinafter NCVHS
RECOMMENDATIONS] ("The Committee's hearings showed strong and widespread
support for federal health privacy legislation."); Gellman, supra note 87, at 139 ("With
only limited exceptions, there is a broad consensus that favors replacing state privacy laws
with a uniform federal law."). It has been suggested that support among privacy
advocates for a federal solution may have waned somewhat in recent years. See Gellman,
supra note 87, at 140 n.47. However, the enactment of the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), see infra notes 232-36 and accompanying
text, has likely arrested any decline in support. Concern that the adoption of federal
standards for the electronic exchange of information and the creation of a national
patient identifier number will further erode privacy, see infra notes 233-35 and
accompanying text, has led advocacy groups to argue that strong privacy protections are
more necessary than ever, see, e.g., American Psychiatric Association, APA President
Herbert S. Sacks, M.D. Calls Administration Medical Confidentiality Bill "A Giant Leap
Backward" 2 (Sept. 11, 1997) (press release) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (stating that the passage of HIPAA "make[s] it all the more important to enact
meaningful medical records privacy legislation").
186. See OTA, supra note 12, at 18.
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maintained in secret; (2) individuals should have means of
determining what information is held about them and how it is used;
(3) individuals should have means to amend incorrect information
concerning themselves; (4) personal information should not be used
for purposes other than those for which it was collected without the
consent of the subject of the information; and (5) organizations that
create, maintain, or disclose identifiable information must assure its
reliability and take reasonable precautions to prevent its misuse."
These principles have served as the foundation of almost every effort
to pass confidentiality legislation. 8 '
What remains the subject of serious disagreement is how to
translate these principles into practice. 89  While both privacy
advocates and health industry organizations agree that a federal
health confidentiality law is desirable, they do so with different
objectives in mind.' Patient rights organizations and privacy
advocates seek legislation rooted in the principle Professor Alan
Westin calls "privacy," which he defines as "the question of what
personal information should be collected or stored at all for a given
social function" and what amount of control the individual will have
over his personal information. 19' Advocates view federal legislation
principally as a means of providing strong, baseline privacy
protection for health information regardless of its location. 1"' As
such, they emphasize the need to minimize access to personal
information to the extent possible and stress the importance of
informed consent requirements. 3  While recognizing that society
187. SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMm. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYs., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS 41 (1973). The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is now the
Department of Health and Human Services.
188. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 7-8, 10; OTA, supra note
12, at 18.
189. See infra Part IV.
190. See Gellman, supra note 87, at 140.
191. ALAN F. WESTIN, COMPUTERS, HEALTH RECORDS, AND CITIZEN RIGHTS 6
(1976) (emphasis added).
192. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 100-01 (statement of the ACLU).
193. See Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 132 (statement of the American
Psychiatric Association) (arguing that "[flederal legislation should not permit the
disclosure of confidential information ... without the individual's consent except in
narrowly-defined emergency circumstances"); Denise M. Nagel, Prepared Statement on
Behalf of the National Coalition for Patient Rights et al. Before the Subcomm. on Privacy
and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 2 (Feb. 19, 1997)
(unpublished statement, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Nagel
Statement] (arguing that the right to privacy should be overcome only by a showing of
"compelling public need" such as "dangerousness to self or others" or "epidemic
control"); ACLU, ACLU Says New Medical Privacy Legislation Falls Short 1 (May 19,
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sometimes requires access to personal information, privacy advocates
critically question the need to circulate health information beyond
the health care provider and regard the development of a health
information infrastructure as a threat to the individual's ability to
control the distribution of information about himself.194
By contrast, many users of health data seek legislation based on
the principle Professor Westin calls "confidentiality," meaning "the
question of how personal data collected for approved social purposes
shall be held and used by the organization that originally collected it,
what other secondary or further uses may be made of it, and when
consent by the individual will be required for such uses." 195
Hospitals, insurers, information processing companies, managed care
organizations, utilization review agents, health researchers, and
others begin with the premise that access to and sharing of data are
critical for a well-functioning health care system and necessary to
achieve social goods such as the elimination of health care fraud and
surveillance of emerging diseases.1 6 They advocate the creation of a
federal law that will remove the present obstacles to the flow of
information and will provide clear and uniform rules concerning its
use, storage, and transfer in a computerized environment. 197 While
acknowledging the importance of privacy rights, these users of
information believe that overly stringent guidelines will inhibit their
ability to function and will rob society of the benefits they seek to
provide."8
1998) (press release) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (stating the ACLU's
belief that no disclosure of any kind should be allowed without written patient
authorization).
194. See, e.g., A.G. Breitenstein & Denise M. Nagel, Editorial, Keep Your Health
History Private, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 20,1997, at B7.
195. WESTiN, supra note 191, at 6. There are no universally accepted definitions for
"privacy" or "confidentiality." See OTA, supra note 12, at 8. Legal scholars disagree on
whether the terms represent the same, distinct, or overlapping ideas. See id. It is not the
intention of this Comment to enter this debate; however, Professor Westin's treatment of
these concepts supplies a useful framework for understanding an important distinction in
how many in the health care industry and privacy community view the direction that
comprehensive federal legislation should take.
196. See infra Part IV.C.1-5.
197. See, e.g., Jeanne Schulte Scott, Prepared Statement on Behalf of the Association
for Electronic Health Care Transactions Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and
Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 1 (Feb. 3, 1997)
(unpublished statement, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) ("Many of the
proposals that have been put forth ... are expected to give our industry clear
guidelines.").
198. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 179 (statement of the American
Hospital Association) (advocating a balance between protection of privacy and "the
necessary flow of health information for clinical and administrative purposes");
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Implicit in these positions is a long-standing tension between the
right to privacy and the need for access to information about an
individual's health.199 Resolving this tension in a manner that a
majority of interested parties will support is not an easy task. In a
recent report to the Secretary of HHS, the National Committee on
Vital & Health Statistics ("NCVHS") acknowledged that "[h]ealth
privacy legislation - presents only hard choices and difficult
tradeoffs."2 0 As one commentator has framed the dilemma, do we
restrict access to health data so as to achieve "reasonable levels" of
privacy, recognizing that many social needs will be negatively
affected, or do we conclude that these social needs are so important
that we are willing to forego a promise of "absolute or even
significant" privacy in our health information?2 1
The weight of authority suggests that the latter choice is
preferable to the extent that it acknowledges that privacy rights are
not absolute; society has a legitimate need to access personally
identifiable health information for certain purposes, and individuals
cannot realistically expect to withhold all information about
themselves at the expense of the public interest °2 As a condition of
Thompson Statement, supra note 54, at 3 ("We do not support federal legislation that
would needlessly interfere with communications between pharmacists and their patients
and pharmacists and other health care providers.").
199. See Gostin, supra note 12, at 453, 513-16.
200. NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 3.
201. Gostin, supra note 12, at 455.
202. See, e.g., Privacy in the Electronic Age, supra note 75, at 23 (Prepared Statement
of Donna Shalala, Secretary of HHS) ("Just like our free speech rights, privacy rights can
never be absolute."); NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 3 ("[N]o one can
expect that the health care system will be restructured solely in the interests of privacy
and without regard to cost."); Gostin, supra note 12, at 515 (asserting that ethical claims
in support of a health information infrastructure are as strong as ethical arguments in
favor of privacy); Schwartz, supra note 12, at 309 ("Rather than creating an absolute
individual power over personal information, the law should evaluate competing values
and strike a balance between individual and societal interests. An individual's control
over medical ... information cannot be complete because, at least to some extent, these
data reflect an outside social reality."). The House Committee on Government
Operations echoed this view when favorably reporting (later unsuccessful) health privacy
legislation during the health care reform debate of 1994. The Committee specifically
noted that the legislation at hand was a "code of fair information practices bill" and not a
"privacy bill." H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 82 (1994). The reason for this distinction,
the Committee asserted, was that "[i]n the last decade of the twentieth century, it is
simply not possible to propose legislation that can promise that health information will be
absolutely private." Id. at 83. This viewpoint is not, of course, without its critics. For a
contrary argument, see Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 108
(prepared statement of A.G. Breitenstein) ("[Proposals permitting non-consensual
disclosures of information are] justified on the radical and dubious notion that American
patients must give up their right to privacy in order to fulfill their 'public responsibility' to
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access, however, users of information should abide by strong
guidelines governing how they obtain personal information, to what
purposes it may be put, and to whom it may be disclosed, and the
interest of individuals in information concerning themselves must be
recognized.20 3 The "fair information" principles outlined above are
widely considered the most promising means to "promote an
individual's capacity for decisionmaking while also safeguarding
society's interest in increasing the efficiency and quality of health
service.
,2 04
C. Failed Attempts to Enact a Federal Law
Despite widespread agreement with the fair information
principles, repeated attempts to enact a federal health confidentiality
law have been unsuccessful. Since the development of the fair
information practices code, there have been three major legislative
efforts to pass confidentiality legislation.0 5 Spurred by the 1977
report of the Privacy Protection Study Commission, numerous bills
relating to health information privacy were introduced during the
96th Congress (1979-80).O6 One of the primary reasons that these
bills failed was strong opposition by members of the health care
industry.07 Because the bills were introduced before the era of
integration, interstate operations, and reliance on computerized
networks, the industry did not then see any benefit in the creation of
uniform privacy guidelines at the federal level and instead preferred
to operate under existing state laws.208 An additional reason for the
failure of the bills was pressure from the law enforcement community
an increasingly complex health care system. This notion is historically foreign to the
American democratic system.").
203. See, e.g., Gostin, supra note 12, at 515-16 ("[O]ne of the burdens of achieving cost
effective and accessible care is a loss of privacy. In exchange for this diminution in
individual rights, the government is obliged to create reasonably strong assurances of fair
informational practices, without losing the benefits of a health information system.").
204. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 309.
205. See infra notes 206-31 and accompanying text.
206. See S. 2330, 96th Cong. (1980); S. 865, 96th Cong. (1979); S. 503, 96th Cong.
(1979); H.R. 3444, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 2979, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 2465, 96th
Cong. (1979); H.R. 2115, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 361, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 360, 96th
Cong. (1979).
207. See Gellman, supra note 87, at 139 (citing Privacy of Medical Records: Hearings
on H.R. 2979 and H.R. 3444 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't
Operations, 96th Cong. 1088 (1979) (statement of the American Hospital Association)).
208. See id. As noted previously, the industry has made a dramatic turnaround in its
position, solidifying the widespread political support needed for passage of a uniform
federal law. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
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not to enact restrictions on its access to healthinformation. °9
The bills of the 96th Congress were nonetheless significant for
creating the legislative framework used in most subsequent efforts to
create a comprehensive federal law. The bills embodied many of the
fair information practice principles described previously.2 10 For
example, one of the most comprehensive pieces of legislation
outlined procedures for patients to inspect and amend medical
information held about themselves; required health institutions
affected by the legislation to create written notices of the information
practices; prohibited the disclosure of personally identifiable
information without consent of the individual or statutory
authorization; authorized nonconsensual disclosures for specific
purposes only, including public health investigations, health research,
and law enforcement; specified procedures, including warrant and
subpoena requirements, for government agencies and law
enforcement to obtain data; and required affected health institutions
to keep an accounting of certain disclosures.2 1 Essentially all of the
health privacy legislation introduced since that time has incorporated
these provisions with varying degrees of fidelity.
212
Following the failure of these early bills, the movement to enact
a comprehensive privacy law lay relatively dormant until the Clinton
Administration's health care reform efforts of 1994. Representative
Gary Condit 3 introduced one of the major pieces of health privacy
legislation in the 103d Congress, the Fair Health Information
Practices Act,214  which was later incorporated into the
Administration's health care reform legislation.2 15 Although the
Condit proposal failed along with the larger reform effort, it is
notable for defining the scope of protected health information
209. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 63 (statement of the Center for
Democracy and Technology); see also infra notes 415-17 and accompanying text
(discussing why law enforcement desires access to health records).
210. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
211. See Federal Privacy of Medical Information Act, H.R. 5935, 96th Cong. (1979).
For further analysis of H.R. 5935, see H.R. REP. No. 96-832, pt. 1 (1980) (House Comm.
on Gov't Operations).
212. See infra Part IV.
213. Representative Condit is a Democrat from California.
214. H.R. 4077, 103d Cong. (1994). A similar piece of legislation, the Health Care
Privacy Protection Act, was introduced in the Senate by Senator Patrick Leahy, a
Democrat from Vermont. See S. 2129, 103d Cong. (1994). This bill did not reach the
floor.
215. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 67 (1994) (accompanying the Health Security
Act of 1994, H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. (1994)).
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broadly216 and for introducing the concept of the "health information
trustee." The bill defined a trustee as one who "creates or receives
protected health information" while acting in the capacity of a health
care provider, benefit plan, oversight agency, researcher, or public
health agency or for judicial, administrative, legal, or law
enforcement purposes. 17  Anyone meeting this definition who
received personally identifiable information from another source
would qualify as a trustee and would be subject to the Act's
provisions,2  thus ensuring that data would remain subject to
confidentiality rules as it traveled from user to user. This approach
addresses some of the problems posed by the current system of
protection, in which state confidentiality laws frequently apply only
to specific data users,219 and most subsequent legislative proposals
have incorporated the notion of the health information trustee for
this reason.220
With the failure of President Clinton's reform efforts, the 104th
Congress turned its attention toward more incremental changes. The
Condit bill resurrected interest in a comprehensive federal law and
several legislative proposals were forthcoming. In the House,
Representative Jim McDermott 2' introduced the Medical Privacy in
the Age of New Technologies Act.' The McDermott bill, although
similar to the Condit bill in format, incorporated significantly more
rigorous privacy protections than previous proposals. 3  In the
216. The bill defined "protected health information" as "any information, whether
oral or recorded in any form or medium, that ... relates to the past, present, or future
physical or mental health of an individual, the provision of health care to an individual, or
payment for the provision of health care"; identifies the individual or reasonably could be
used to identify the individual; and is created or received by a health provider, benefit
plan, oversight agency, researcher, or public health agency. H.R. 4077 § 3(a)(3).
217. Id. § 3(b)(3), (6), (8), (9).
218. See id. §§ 3(b)(3), 101, 102(a), 103(a).
219. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 3(7) (1997).
221. Representative McDermott, a Democrat from the state of Washington, is also a
psychiatrist.
222. H.R. 3482, 104th Cong. (1996). Representative Condit also introduced a bill
substantially similar to this proposal in the previous Congress. See H.R. 435, 104th Cong.
(1996).
223. For example, unlike other proposals, H.R. 3482 would have required the consent
of the individual for all disclosures of personally identifiable information to health
researchers, see H.R. 3482 § 210(a); prohibited the matching, linking, or aggregating of
any protected health information held by two or more health information trustees without
specific authorization of the individual, see id. § 201(i); required a "specific nexus"
between the need to identify an individual and a risk of death or injury to another for
nonconsensual disclosure to public health agencies, id. § 209(a); and required health
information trustees to follow specified additional privacy guidelines if requested by an
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Senate, the Medical Records Confidentiality Act, 4 introduced by
Senator Robert Bennett,2 took a more permissive approach with
provisions aimed at facilitating the flow of health information
z26
Although pleased with the general direction of the Bennett bill, much
of the health care industry was dissatisfied with particular provisions
and proposed changes that would allow them to support the bill
fully. 7 By contrast, many privacy advocates viewed sections of the
Bennett bill as a significant threat to privacy and sought numerous
alterations to ensure more stringent regulation of the access, use, and
disclosure of data.' While some of the changes sought by industry
and privacy advocates were incorporated into a rewrite of the bill,2 29
individual, see id. § 201(c).
224. S. 1360, 104th Cong. (1995). Although there are no agreed upon definitions for
"privacy" and "confidentiality," see supra note 195, under Professor Westin's definition, it
is interesting to note that Representative McDermott introduced a "Privacy" bill while
Senator Bennett introduced a "Confidentiality" bill.
225. Senator Bennett is a Republican from Utah. The bill garnered an impressive list
of 20 co-sponsors, including Senators Thomas Daschle, Robert Dole, Orrin Hatch, Nancy
Kassebaum, Edward Kennedy, and Patrick Leahy, and was often referred to as the
"Bennett-Leahy" bill.
226. Compared with the McDermott bill, see supra notes 222-23, as introduced S. 1360
did not require the consent of the individual for the disclosure of information to health
researchers, see S.1360 § 209(a), nor did it prohibit the linking of data held by two or
more health information trustees, impose any relationship requirement between the
identity of an individual and a specific threat to the public for nonconsensual disclosure to
public health authorities, see id § 208, or give individuals the right to request segregation
of their health information and additional safeguards.
227. The health care industry was greatly concerned that the Bennett bill would place
significant burdens on the use of intermediary agents, such as electronic claims
processors, to transmit and store data. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at
109-11 (statement of the Association for Electronic Health Care Transactions) ("As
introduced, this bill would wipe out the entire health information service industry."). The
bill would have applied the responsibilities of trusteeship to these "health information
services." S. 1360 § 3(6), (7)(A)(i). In theory, these agents would have had to obtain the
consent of the patient to transmit the data to its ultimate, intended recipient and would
also have been subject to demands by individuals to inspect their health information. See
id. §§ 101-102, 202-203. Members of the health care industry were also concerned about
how the bill's consent-to-disclose requirement would affect the circulation of information
within an institution. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 146 (statement of
Health Industry Manufacturer's Association).
228. Changes sought by some public interest groups included refining the preemption
section of the bill to permit states to enact more stringent privacy laws in a broad range of
areas, see, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 141-42 (statement of the Consumer
Project on Technology), as well as restricting the nonconsensual access to information by
health researchers, oversight agencies, public health agencies, and law enforcement, see
id. at 145.
229. A revised but never formally introduced version of the bill was circulated in April
of 1996. Among the changes reflected in the revised version were the addition of a
section of principles underlying the bill, a new requirement that consent be obtained in
most cases for the release of personally identifiable health data for use in health research,
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neither side was completely satisfied and discussions became mired in
disagreement13 0 The Bennett bill ultimately died due to lack of
support from both industry and privacy advocates,231 and the
McDermott and reintroduced Condit bills saw little progress in a
Republican-controlled House.
Although efforts to enact a comprehensive confidentiality law
had once again failed, the 104th Congress did pass landmark health
reform legislation with important provisions related to privacy. To
facilitate the development of a health information infrastructure, the
"Administrative Simplification" subtitle of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA")" 2 requires
the Secretary of HHS to adopt uniform standards for the electronic
and a new requirement that law enforcement meet a "clear and convincing" evidence
standard for a warrant to obtain health-related information. See CDT POLICY POST (Ctr.
for Democracy and Tech., Washington, D.C.), Apr. 12, 1996, at 1-2
<http://www.cdt.org/publicationslpp-2.14.html>.
230. An informal "working group" was formed in an effort to reach a compromise
agreeable to most interested parties. Participants in this working group included the
AIDS Action Council, American Civil Liberties Union, American Health Information
Management Association, American Hospital Association, American Medical
Association, American Psychiatric Association, Association for Electronic Health Care
Transactions, Center for Democracy and Technology, Center for Medical
Consumers/New York Public Interest Group, Consumer Project on Technology,
International Billing Association, JRI Health Law Institute, National Coalition for
Patient Rights, Privacy Journal, Public Citizen's Health Research Group, and the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. This diverse group of organizations was
strongly divided on many aspects of S. 1360. See Memorandum from Chai Feldblum,
Federal Legislation Clinic of Georgetown University Law Center, & Janlori Goldman,
Center for Democracy and Technology, to Working Group on S. 1360 (Dec. 19,1995) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
231. See Lee Siegel, Bennett to Reintroduce Records Bill, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 14,
1997, at Al; cf. Fraud, Abuse and Confidentiality, APA FED. NE\VSL. (Am. Psychiatric
Ass'n), June-July 1996, at 4-6 <http://www.psych.orglpub-pol-advlfn-jj96.html>
(describing efforts by some privacy advocates to defeat the Bennett bill). One notable
exception was the Center for Democracy and Technology ("CDT"), a "non-profit public
interest organization ... [whose] mission is to develop ... public policies that advance
democratic values and constitutional civil liberties in new computer and communications
technologies." CDT POLICY POST, supra note 229, at 3. CDT believed the revised
version of the bill to be "extremely strong" and urged the Senate Committee on Labor
and Human Resources to approve it "unanimously." Id. at 1.
232. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d to d-8 (West Supp. 1998). HIPAA is commonly called
"Kassebaum-Kennedy" in reference to the two senators most closely associated with the
legislation. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Hearing on P.L.
104-191 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 1 (1997)
(statement of Sen. Jeffords). For a detailed analysis of the Administrative Simplification
provisions of HIPAA, see Frangoise Gilbert, Privacy of Medical Records? The Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 Creates a Framework for the
Establishment of Security Standards and the Protection of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 73 N.D. L. REV. 93 (1997).
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exchange of health information and for the creation of a unique
identification number for every person, provider, health plan, and
employer. 3  Concurrent with these provisions, the Act also requires
the Secretary to submit to Congress within twelve months "detailed
recommendations on standards with respect to the privacy of
individually-identifiable health information."' If Congress fails to
pass legislation governing privacy standards for health data
maintained in electronic format within thirty-six months of HIPAA's
enactment, the Secretary is ordered to promulgate regulations that
233. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2(a), (b) (West Supp. 1998). The Act also requires the
Secretary to promulgate security standards for the protection of health information, see
id. § 1320d-2(d)(1), and requires those who use health information to maintain
"reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards," id.
§ 1320d-2(d)(2).
Privacy advocates, doctors, and the psychiatry community have strongly criticized
portions of the Administrative Simplification subtitle of HIPAA as a threat to privacy.
These groups especially oppose the requirement that the Secretary of HHS adopt
standards for a unique patient identifier for each individual, fearing that increased ease of
computerized access will facilitate the abuse of confidential health information, allowing a
user of health information to track an individual's medical history. See, e.g., American
Psychiatric Association, supra note 185, at 1-2 (expressing doubt that HHS can develop a
unique patient identifier system that will protect confidentiality); Breitenstein & Nagel,
supra note 194, at B7 (calling the unique patient identifier provision a "ticking time
bomb"); Health Data.: Implementation of Unique Patient Identifier May Be Cause for
Concern About Abuse, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (July 24, 1998), available in
WESTLAW, BNA-HCD database (describing AMA's opposition to implementation of a
unique patient identifier until further research demonstrates its necessity). At the least,
privacy advocates argue, HHS should not proceed with implementation of a unique
patient identifier until a confidentiality law has been enacted. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R.
52, supra note 27, at 54 (statement of Janlori Goldman, visiting scholar, Georgetown
University Law Center).
Cognizant of the privacy concerns raised by the unique patient identifier, the Clinton
Administration announced in late July 1998 that it would accede to a delay and would not
permit implementation of the identifier until confidentiality legislation is enacted. See
Privacy: No Patient Health Identifier Until Privacy Bill Passes, Gore Says, Health Care
Daily Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 3, 1998), available in WESTLAW, BNA-HCD database. Also
concerned about threats to privacy posed by an identification number, Republican
legislators have introduced legislation that would require Congress's approval of any
patient identification system promulgated by HS, see Health Data: Proposed Rule on
Security Standards for Health Information to Be Out Within Days, Health Care Daily Rep.
(BNA) (Aug. 6, 1998), available in WESTLAW, BNA-HCD database (noting a provision
promoted by House Republicans); Politics & Policy Health Care IDs: Senate Moves to
Delay Debut, American Health Line (APN) (Sept. 4, 1998), available in WESTLAW,
APN-HE database (noting legislation introduced by Republican Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison of Texas), or would revise HIPAA to eliminate the patient identifier
requirement altogether, see H.R. 4281, 105th Cong. § 2 (1998) (introduced by Rep. Ron
Paul, a Republican from Texas).
234. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2, Historical and Statutory Notes (West Supp. 1998)
(Recommendations with Respect to Privacy of Certain Health Information).
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will create such standards. 5 HIPAA has, in effect, set a deadline for
congressional action; if a federal health confidentiality law is not
enacted by August 21, 1999, HHS regulations will determine, in part,
the privacy rights of individuals and the responsibilities of data
holders, an outcome both privacy advocates and the health care
industry wish to avoid. 6
Should Congress fail to act, it would not be the first deadline it
has missed. On October 24, 1998, the European Union ("E.U.") data
privacy directive ("Directive")237 took effect, by which time the
privacy laws of all E.U. member states were required to conform to
its provisions238 The Directive generally requires data holders to
inform data subjects of information held about them;239 collect data
only for specified and legitimate purposes; maintain the accuracy of
the data; remove identifiers as soon as possible;240 take steps to
prevent the accidental destruction or loss of data or the unauthorized
alteration or disclosure of data;241 and, in certain circumstances, to
obtain the data subject's consent for disclosure.242 The Directive also
grants data subjects the right to inspect data held about them and to
object to certain uses of such data. 43 Of specific concern is a
provision that prohibits the transfer of personally identifiable data
between E.U. members and nations without data standards that
ensure "an adequate level of protection."2' While the Directive
provides certain exceptions to this provision,245 there is much concern
that the failure of the United States to enact a health confidentiality
law will interrupt the flow of health data between the United States
235. See id. (citing § 264(c)(1) of the HIPAA legislation, P.L. 104-191).
236. See, e.g., NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 2 (noting that there is
"virtually no industry or public support" for the regulatory approach but instead a "clear
and strong preference for a legislative solution"). One reason for the preference for
legislation is that HHS's regulatory powers under HIPAA would extend only to electronic
health data. See supra notes 233-35 and accompanying text. It would be difficult to
implement and enforce rules that apply to health information in electronic format but not
to data in paper format. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 2.
Another reason, of course, is that it would be more difficult to alter rights and obligations
imposed by statute than for a government agency to promulgate new regulations.
237. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, art. 32, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 49.
238. See id.
239. See id. art. 10, at 41.
240. See id. art. 6, at 40.
241. See id. art. 17, at 43.
242. See id. art. 7, at 40.
243. See id. art. 12, at 42.
244. Id. art. 25, at 45-46.
245. See id. art. 26, at 46.
[Vol. 77
1998] HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY 317
and Europe246 -particularly personally identifiable data used for
medical research and public health purposes 47
D. Post-HIPAA Developments at the Federal Level
Pursuant to HIPAA's requirements, HHS Secretary Donna
Shalala presented the Clinton Administration's recommendations for
health privacy legislation to Congress in September 1997.1 s Like
previous legislative proposals, the recommendations incorporate the
basic principles of fair information practices: patients should have
the right to access, inspect, and petition to amend information about
themselves; health information should not be disclosed to others
without the consent of the individual or explicit statutory
authorization; disclosure of information should be limited to the
minimum amount necessary to accomplish the purpose of the
disclosure; information should be used only for purposes compatible
with and related to the purpose for which it was collected or received;
and those who use health information must take reasonable steps to
ensure its reliability and confidentiality.249 In her congressional
testimony, however, Secretary Shalala noted that these principles
246. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1368, supra note 156, at 7 (opening statement of Sen.
Jeffords). Although the present amount of identifiable health data exchanged between
Europe and the United States is relatively small, the continued growth of electronic
commerce will make such exchanges "commonplace" in the future. Id. at 131 (statement
of the European Union).
247. Public health and research information comprise much of the international
movement of individually identifiable health data. For instance, the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention imports health data from other countries as part of its
public health investigations, while medical centers and pharmaceutical companies share
clinical-trial data with counterparts around the world. See LOWRANCE, supra note 66, at
20.
248. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 3-7 (statement of
Donna E. Shalala, Secretary of HHS). HIPAA required the Secretary to consult with the
National Committee on Vital & Health Statistics ("NCVHS") in preparing
recommendations for health privacy legislation. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2, Historical
and Statutory Notes (West Supp. 1998) (Recommendations with Respect to Privacy of
Certain Health Information). Pursuant to this requirement, the NCVHS Subcommittee
on Privacy and Confidentiality held eight days of public hearings involving more than 80
witnesses from a wide range of health care industry, public interest, state government,
public health, and research organizations and agencies. See Letter from Don E. Detmer,
M.D., Chairman, National Committee on Vital and Health Statistics, to Donna E. Shalala,
Secretary of HS 1 (June 27, 1997) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). The
Committee's report to the Secretary found that "[t]he United States is in the midst of a
health privacy crisis" and recommended that the Clinton Administration "assign the
highest priority to the development of a strong position on health privacy." NCVHS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 1-2. For discussion of the Committee's findings
and recommendations on specific health privacy issues, see infra Part IV.
249. See HS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 8-9.
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must be weighed against the principle of "public responsibility" and
that legislation must strike a balance between privacy and societal
interests; health care information must be made available, she
argued, for public health, antifraud, law enforcement, and other
necessary purposes.20
Various provisions in the Administration's recommendations
met with immediate criticism. Public interest groups and the
psychiatric community have condemned the proposal as a threat to
privacy for permitting, in their view, easy access to information by
numerous parties, especially law enforcement.2 1 At the same time,
some members of the health care industry have expressed concern
that certain recommendations, if enacted into law, would inhibit
worthwhile activities such as health research.252
While HHS formulated its recommendations, the
Administration addressed the confidentiality issue through other
means. In September 1996, President Clinton issued an executive
order creating the Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection
and Quality in the Health Care Industry ("Commission"). 15 At the
President's behest, in November 1997 the Commission formulated a
Patient Bill of Rights ("Bill of Rights") for health care.2s4 The
Commission articulated eight areas of consumer rights and
responsibilities, including a right to privacy: "Consumers have the
right to communicate with health care providers in confidence and to
have the confidentiality of their individually identifiable health care
information protected. Consumers also have the right to review and
250. Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 5-6 (testimony of Donna
E. Shalala, Secretary of HHS).
251. See, e.g., ACLU, Clinton Privacy Recommendations Open Medical Records to
Desktop Snooping 1-2 (Sept. 11, 1997) (press release) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review); American Psychiatric Association, supra note 185, at 2.
252. See, e.g., Lisa Seachrist, Shalala's Medical Privacy Report Gets Mixed Reviews,
BIOWORLD Today, Sept. 15, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 1130970 (reporting
concern of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Researchers of America that
conferring on patients the right to demand inspection of their health information would
frustrate clinical research trials). For discussion of privacy issues and research, see infra
notes 326-59 and accompanying text.
253. See Exec. Order No. 13,017, 3 C.F.R. 215-16 (1997). The purpose of the
Commission is to "advise the President on changes occurring in the health care system
and recommend such measures as may be necessary to promote and assure health care
quality and value, and protect consumers and workers in the health care system." Id.
The Commission consists of 34 representatives from consumer organizations, health care
providers, health plans, insurers, business, and government.
254. See ADVISORY COMM'N ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY IN THE
HEALTH CARE INDUS., CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1997).
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copy their own medical records and request amendments to their
records." 5 Pursuant to this right, the Commission concluded: health
information should not, except in limited circumstances, be used for
non-health purposes without consent; when practicable, anonymized
data should be used instead of individually identifiable data; non-
consensual disclosures should be permitted only in limited
circumstances; and, when disclosures must occur, only the minimum
amount of information necessary to effect the purpose should be
disclosed.z6 President Clinton endorsed the Commission's findings
and urged the private sector to adopt voluntarily these and other
provisions of the Bill of Rights.z7 The President also ordered federal
agencies to review their health-related programs for compliance with
the Bill of Rights and called on Congress to pass legislation as soon
as possible that would make these rights "the law of the land.""8
Separate from a Bill of Rights, several members of the 105th
Congress have introduced their own stand-alone health
255. Id. at 53.
256. See id.
257. See President's Remarks Announcing the Health Care "Consumer Bill of Rights
and Responsibilities," 33 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1868,1870-71 (Nov. 24, 1997). The
President noted that telecommunications giant GTE is the first large company to
guarantee the provisions of the bill of rights to all persons covered by its health plan. See
id. at 1871.
258. Id. at 1870-71. In February 1998, President Clinton issued a memorandum
directing the Secretaries of Defense, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Veterans
Affairs ("V.A.") and the Director of the Office of Personnel Management to ensure that
their programs--including Medicare, Medicaid, the military health system, the V.A.
health system, and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan-comply with the
principles of the "Patient Bill of Rights," including the confidentiality provision. See
Memorandum on Federal Agency Compliance with the Patient Bill of Rights, 34
WEEKLY COvn. PREs. Doc. 298,298-99 (Feb. 23,1998).
In the summer of 1998, Democractic members of Congress took up the President's
challenge to enact a Patient Bill of Rights, see S. 1890, 105th Cong (1998); H.R. 3605,
105th Cong. (1998), and the Republicans responded with their own proposals, see S. 2330,
105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998). All four bills included provisions
relating to the confidentiality of health information, though none provided comprehensive
protection. See S. 2330 §§ 211-232; S. 1890 § 122; H.R. 4250 §§ 5001-5004; H.R. 3605
§ 122. The Republican-controlled House passed the Republican proposal, H.R. 4250,
despite criticism from privacy advocates who argued that its confidentiality provisions
would actually further erode patient privacy. See Privacy: Confidentiality Language in
House GOP Bill Draws Fire from Private Group, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (July
23, 1998), available in WESTLAW, BNA-HCD database. As of October 1998, the Senate
had not acted on any Bill of Rights proposal; friction between the parties on the issue,
coupled with a lack of time remaining in the current session, led some observers to predict
that passage of any Bill of Rights legislation was unlikely. See Insurance Regulation:
Senate Returns to Continued Deadlock, New Uncertainty on Managed Care Reform,
Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (Aug. 31, 1998), available in WESTLAW, BNA-HCD
database.
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confidentiality bills. In January 1997, Representative Condit
reintroduced his prior bill, now known as the Fair Health
Information Practices Act of 1997.1 9 Representative McDermott
also reintroduced his confidentiality legislation, the Medical Privacy
in the Age of New Technologies Act. 60 In the Senate, Senators
Patrick Leahy and Ted Kennedy introduced the Medical Information
Privacy and Security Act at the end of 1997,261 while Senator Bennett
circulated a draft of his proposed legislation.262 Senator James
Jeffords, Chairman of the Committee on Labor and Human
Resources, intended to co-sponsor the Bennett proposal but
withdrew his support because of policy disagreements with Senator
Bennett.263 Senator Jeffords subsequently introduced his own bill,
the Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act, in April
259. H.R. 52, 105th Cong. (1997). As introduced, H.R. 52 differs from its predecessor
from the 104th Congress, H.R. 435, in several respects. Notably, H.R. 435 largely
preempted state law, permitting states to enact more stringent rules only with regard to
mental health and public health information. See H.R. 435, 104th Cong. § 304(a)-(b)
(1995). H.R. 52 retains this provision but would also allow states to enact more stringent
rules pertaining to the use and disclosure of information by state agencies. See H.R. 52
§ 304(d); Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 31 (statement of Rep. Gary Condit).
260. H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. (1997).
261. S. 1368, 105th Cong. (1997). The Leahy-Kennedy bill would force trustees to
comply with requests by individuals to segregate specific information within their health
records, prohibit the internal use or transfer of this segregated information without
specific authorization by the individual, and prohibit the maintenance of this information
in a computerized format. See id. § 202(f). It also would not preempt any state or federal
law that provided for more stringent protections. See id. § 401(a). The Leahy-Kennedy
bill differs substantially with the Condit bill in these areas, see supra note 259, but mirrors
similar provisions in the McDermott bill permitting segregation of information, see HR.
1815 § 201(c), and more stringent state laws, see id. § 402(a). For discussion of the
desirability for differing confidentiality standards for different kinds of information, see
infra notes 493-502 and accompanying text. For discussion of whether patients should be
able to determine the medium of information storage, see infra notes 520-29 and
accompanying text.
262. See Privacy: House Republican Task Force Working on Legislation to Protect
Patient Data, Health Care Daily Rep. (BNA) (July 13, 1998) available in WESTLAW,
BNA-HCD database.
263. Senator Jeffords grew concerned that Congress would not enact a health
confidentiality law before the E.U. Directive took effect. See Jeffords and Dodd Say
Privacy Bill Must Help U.S. Companies Beat E.U. Data Deadline, HEALTH LEGIS. &
REG. WKLY., Apr. 8, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10395736. He apparently believed that
Senator Bennett's most recent proposal, which would provide for complete preemption of
state law, would not gain sufficient support among privacy advocates to pass. Cf. id.
(reporting that Senator Jeffords's concern about the E.U. Directive deadline led him "to
halt temporarily his attempt to find common ground" with Senator Bennett and instead
introduce his own legislation that would permit more stringent state laws pertaining to
mental health and public health data); see also infra note 514 and accompanying text
(describing preemption provisions of Sen. Jeffords's bill).
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IV. SIGNFICANT ISSUES FOR HEALTH CONFIDENTIALITY
LEGISLATION
HIPAA and the E.U. Directive have created a sense of urgency
in the effort to enact a comprehensive federal law governing the
rights and responsibilities of parties in relation to health
information.265  Because Congress failed to enact comprehensive
legislation by the time the E.U. Directive took effect in October
1998, our ability to exchange health information with E.U. member
states may already be restricted. And, if Congress fails to act by
August 1999, regulations will determine the extent of protection
covering computerized health data within the United States.
Whether Congress will be able to enact any of the proposals currently
before it remains to be seen. An inability to reach agreement on a
number of issues in a way that satisfies most parties has been the
principal stumbling block to the enactment of a federal law.266 An
analysis of recent efforts to enact a comprehensive federal law
reveals that although there are numerous areas of agreement,
significant differences of opinion remain.
A. What Is Protected Health Information?
There is widespread agreement that the scope of protected
information in any federal law should be drawn as broadly as possible
to reflect the vast amount of data collected today. In almost every
proposal, "protected health information" is defined with such
breadth as to encompass any individually identifiable information
created or used by a health information trustee in the treatment or
payment process.267 Protected health information would, therefore,
include: "traditional" treatment data such as diagnoses and
medication history; other sensitive, personal information including
Social Security numbers and financial information; and even
information often considered "public," such as names, addresses, and
264. S. 1921, 105th Cong. (1998).
265. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1368, supra note 156, at 7 (opening statement of Sen.
Jeffords) (noting the deadlines set by HIPAA and the E.U. Directive and emphasizing
that enacting a health confidentiality law is one of the committee's "highest priorities").
266. See infra note 530 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 3(16) (1997) (sponsored by Rep. McDermott);
S. 1360, 105th Cong. § 3(14) (1995) (sponsored by Sen. Bennett); HIHS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 20-21.
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educational history.268
Anonymized information-data that do not directly identify an
individual and for which there is no reasonable basis to believe that
an individual can be so identified-poses little or no threat to
personal privacy and would not fall under the purview of any
currently proposed legislation.269 For example, researchers who wish
to conduct a study using health records already stripped of identifiers
would not have to comply with statutory requirements concerning
access to information for purposes of research. Because no strict
guidelines exist for determining when information is and is not
identifiable, present and past proposals have used only a test of
reasonable likelihood.2 70 It is clear that the results of applying this
standard will vary depending on the identity of the user of
information271 and that, in some circumstances, the disclosure of
seemingly generic information may establish the requisite
likelihood. 272
B. Right of Inspection and Amendment
There is broad consensus that individuals should have the right
to access and request amendment of information held about
themselves.273 This consensus has relatively recent roots. Patients
have traditionally been unable to access health information held
268. See OTA, supra note 12, at 80. It is irrelevant that some persons, including the
individual who is the subject of the information, might not consider a particular piece of
data to be sensitive. If the information is created or obtained in the process of treatment
or payment by a party subject to the legislation and can be linked with an individual, it is
protected health data. See id.
269. See, e.g., H.R. 1815 § 3(16); HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 20-22.
270. See, e.g., H.R. 1815 § 3(16); H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 87 (1994) (discussing
the Fair Health Information Practices Part of the Health Security Act of 1994, H.R. 3600,
103d Cong. 1994)); I-HS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 20.
271. For example, it is unreasonable to believe that the average recipient would be
able to identify the subject of a record containing only a fingerprint; however, the same
record would be protected health information if disclosed to law enforcement officers
because they may have the ability to identify the individual. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601,
at 87.
272. For example, describing an individual as a famous "professional athlete" with
"amyotrophic lateral sclerosis" could have provided a reasonable basis for identifying
Lou Gehrig. Id.
273. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 7 ("The Committee found
no disagreement with the basic principle of patient access and amendment rights."). For a
discussion of patients' right to see their own medical records, as well as a proposed
uniform law guaranteeing such a right, see Ellen Klugman, Comment, Toward a Uniform
Right to Medical Records: A Proposal for a Model Patient Access and Information
Practices Statute, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1349 (1983).
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about themselves,2 74 and even today only twenty-eight states
guarantee a right of inspection.275 The traditional justification offered
for denying access is that physicians should have the ability to
withhold information they believe may be detrimental to the
patient's health.276 This paternalistic reasoning conflicts, however,
with the principle of self-determination.277 Authority to disclose
information about oneself is predicated on the doctrine of informed
consent,278 but consent is not truly informed if the person who is the
subject of the information does not know its contents.279 Some courts
have also noted that patients possess a recognizable property interest
in their health information that confers a right to inspect and copy
the contents of their medical record.10 Other justifications advanced
for a right of inspection include educating patients about their health
status, ensuring the accuracy of information contained within a
record, and ensuring that the record supports charges for services
rendered38 '
For these reasons, inspection rights have been an integral
principle of confidentiality legislation since the first statement of fair
information privacy practices in 1973.? Health confidentiality bills
generally include a provision conferring the right to inspect and copy
information and, if the individual disagrees with its contents, to file a
petition for amendment. 2 3  Only in narrow, statutorily defined
circumstances can the data holder deny the request to inspect.24 The
data holder may refuse to grant a requested amendment but must
274. See OTA, supra note 12, at 71.
275. See supra notes 156-57 and accompanying text.
276. See OTA, supra note 12, at 71.
277. See id.
278. See id. at 70.
279. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
280. See, e.g., WESTIN, supra note 191, at 29 (citing cases upholding a right to inspect
based on a patient's interest in her health information). Those who create a health record
own the record itself, see, e.g., Jo ANNE CZEcOWsKI BRUCE, PRiVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY OF HEALTH CARE INFORMATION 12-13 (1984), but the individual is
generally deemed the owner of the data contained within the record, see id. at 13; OTA,
supra note 12, at 70; Gostin, supra note 12, at 522.
281. See OTA, supra note 12, at 72 (citing AMERICAN HEALTH INFO. MANAGEMENT
ASS'N, POSITION STATEMENT 1 (1992)).
282. See SECRETARY'S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS.,
supra note 187, at 41.
283. See S. 1921, 105th Cong. §§ 101-102 (1998); S. 1368, 105th Cong. §§ 101(a), 102(a)
(1997); H.R. 52, 105th Cong. §§ 101(a), 102(a) (1997); S. 1360, 104th Cong. §§ 101(a),
102(a) (1995). Medical records are not really "corrected," only amended. Information,
even that which is discovered to be incorrect, is not stricken from a medical record. See
BRUCE, supra note 280, at 123-24.
284. See infra notes 291-304 and accompanying text.
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explain its reason for doing so." The individual then has the right to
file a letter explaining her position, which will accompany the
disputed data on all subsequent disclosures.1
6
Although there is little debate concerning the existence of a right
to inspect, some important differences in implementation remain.
An issue of concern for the health care industry has been determining
which data holders are required to permit inspections. At least one
previous health confidentiality bill applied this requirement to all
health information trustees regardless of function.2 Some members
of the health industry, notably electronic claims processors, have
argued that the duty to permit inspection should not apply to parties
who merely transmit or store data for others28s Because they have
neither a direct relationship with the patient nor the medical
expertise to judge amendment requests, these companies assert that
it would be both improper and impractical to require them to permit
access to data.29  Acknowledging this argument, more recent
proposals would generally exempt agents and contractors from the
inspection and amendment obligations, thus requiring the patient to
petition the person or entity that created the data, frequently the
health care provider, which in turn can request the data from the
agent.290
Another point of contention concerns statutory exceptions to the
right to access. 291 An exception common to most proposals is the
right to deny inspection if it is reasonably likely to endanger the life
285. See, e.g., S. 1368 § 102(b); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 102(b) (1997); S. 1360
§ 102(b).
286. See, e.g., S. 1368 § 102(c); H.R. 1815 § 102(c); S. 1360 § 102(c).
287. As introduced, the Medical Records Confidentiality Act of 1995 did not
distinguish among data holders for purposes of the duty to permit inspection. See S. 1360
§§ 101-102.
288. See, e.g., Robert B. Burleigh, Prepared Statement on Behalf of the International
Billing Association Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l
Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 45-46 (Feb. 3, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Burleigh Statement].
289. See Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 83-84 (prepared statement of Merida
L. Johns, M.D., President of the American Health Information Management
Association); Burleigh Statement, supra note 288, at 45-46. Doctors favor this approach
as well, emphasizing that the health provider who generated the data should be the sole
conduit for inspection requests. See Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 60-61
(prepared statement of the American Medical Association).
290. See, e.g., S. 1921, 105th Cong. §§ 101(g), 102(d) (1998); H.R. 3900, 105th Cong.
§§ 201(g), 202(d) (1998); S. 1368 § 101(c); H.R. 1815 § 101(h)(1); H.R. 52, 105th Cong.
§ 101(g) (1997).
291. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 7-8.
[Vol. 77
HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY
or physical safety of any person.29 The mental health community has
advocated an additional exception that would allow the data holder
to refuse access if he reasonably believes that harm will occur to the
patient that outweighs the benefits of inspection.293 Psychiatrists fear
that a requirement to disclose to the patient the "understandings,
interpretations, and thoughts of the practitioner" before the patient is
ready will endanger the therapeutic process.294 Although at least one
proposal has incorporated this request,295 others have not, perhaps
because of a belief that a principal aim of a federal law is to empower
the individual296 or because of concern about what would be the
proper standard for denial 97
Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry has argued that an
exception should be created for certain kinds of research.2 98 In
"blinded" clinical drug trials, research subjects are not told the
identity of the treatment they receive. For example, participants do
not know if they are receiving the medication under study or a
placebo.299 A blanket right to inspect would allow participants to
obtain this information and, the pharmaceutical community argues,
raise questions about the scientific validity of the study.3 0 The
NCVHS found this argument persuasive but noted that no one could
cite a single instance in which a demand to inspect information had
negatively impacted a clinical drug trial.31  The Clinton
Administration, as well as Senator Jeffords, has nonetheless
recommended a narrow exception for clinical trials,'02 but other
292- See S. 1921 § 101(b)(1); H.R. 1815 § 101(b)(1); H.R. 52 § 101(b)(2); S. 1360, 104th
Cong. § 101(b)(1) (1995).
293. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 160 (statement of the American
Psychiatric Association).
294. Id.
295. See S. 1921 § 101(b)(1) (permitting a refusal to allow inspection if the data holder
reasonably believes that doing so could "cause substantial mental harm").
296. Representative Condit gave such an explanation for omitting the exception in his
most recent bill, H.R. 52 § 101(b). See Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 31
(statement of Rep. Gary Condit). He did note, however, that if a strong case could be
made for the exception he would consider reinstating it. See id.
297. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 8.
298. See Richard S. Kent, Testimony on Behalf of the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the
Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 13 (Feb. 4, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on
file with North Carolina Law Review).
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 8.
302. See S. 1921, 105th Cong. § 101(b)(4) (1998); H-S RECOMMENDATIONS, supra
note 155, at 33. Under the Administration's proposal, for example, a trustee could deny
the request for inspection by a clinical trial participant when "the information is collected
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proposals have not followed suit. 03
C. Disclosure and Use of Protected Health Information
There is unanimous agreement that data holders should
generally obtain patient authorization before disclosing personally
identifiable health data."° This principle, one of the five principles of
fair information practices, 0 5 is based on the doctrine of informed
consent; individuals have the same right to determine what happens
to information about their bodies as they do to determine what
happens to their bodies. 6 Consequently, proposals for a health
confidentiality law generally begin with the basic requirement that
data holders cannot disclose identifiable data, or use it for a purpose
other than that for which it was collected, without the data subject's
authorization. 317 Nonetheless, recognizing arguments that a consent
requirement might unreasonably inhibit some legitimate demands for
health information, most proposals also specify certain disclosures
and uses of health data that would not require the patient's
consent.308  An analysis of some of the demands for health data
reveals sharply divergent viewpoints on the proper number and
breadth of exceptions to the consent requirement-as well as
whether exceptions should be permitted at all.309
1. Disclosure for Treatment and Payment
Most proposals contain a requirement forbidding disclosure of
identifiable health data for the purpose of providing care or payment
for care without the patient's informed consent. Widespread concern
exists, however, that there is a disjunction between the theory of
informed consent and the reality of authorized disclosure in the
modem health care system. With the advent of the third-party
in the course of a clinical trial, the trial is in progress, an institutional review board has
approved the denial of access, and the patient has agreed to the denial of access when
consenting to participate." HS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 33.
303. See, e.g., S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 101 (1997); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 101(b)
(1997); S. 1360,104th Cong. § 101(b) (1995).
304. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 8.
305. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
306. See OTA, supra note 12, at 70.
307. See, e.g., S. 1921 §§ 201-203. Representative Shays's bill takes a different
approach; H.R. 3900 expressly defines impermissible uses of health information, thus
permitting other uses. See H.R. 3900,105th Cong. § 101 (1998).
308. See infra notes 310-459 and accompanying text.
309. See infra notes 310-459 and accompanying text. The ACLU, for example, argues
strenuously that a health confidentiality law should not permit any exceptions to the
informed consent requirement. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 193, at 1.
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payment system, many observers argue that an authorization-to-
disclose requirement is meaningless in the case of payment for care
because the patient has no real choice but to consent so that the
provider may be paid.310  This argument posits that consent to
disclose is not truly informed because it fails the requirement of
voluntariness.31 ' There is also widely held concern that many
authorizations fail the requirements of adequate disclosure and
comprehension as well. Blanket and often vague disclosure
authorization forms are presented to and signed by patients with such
frequency that some observers question whether patients fully realize
the consequences of their consent.
Recognizing these concerns, the Clinton Administration's
recommendations depart from the traditional approach to
authorization rules taken by other legislative proposals. Rather than
require the patient's authorization for the disclosure of information
for health care treatment and payment purposes,31 3  the
Administration's plan would permit these disclosures by statute.31 4
Arguably, this approach could actually raise awareness among
patients about threats to confidentiality; because authorization would
still be required for purposes other than health care treatment or
payment, any request for authorization would alert the patient that
the provider wishes to disclose information for purposes unrelated to
the provision of care.315  The Administration contends that this
approach would also avoid the imposition of significant
310. See OTA, supra note 12, at 73.
311. See id. There are four generally accepted requirements for valid informed
consent to medical treatment: "the act of consent must be genuinely voluntary, and there
must be adequate disclosure of information to the patient about what is to be done.
Patients must comprehend what they are being told. .. and be competent to consent." Id.
at 70.
312- See GEORGE J. ANNAS, THE RIGHTS OF PATIENTS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE
TO PATIENT RIGHTS 185 (2d ed. 1989); AHIMA, Resolve to Protect Health Information
Confidentiality in 1998, at 1 (Dec. 29, 1997) (press release) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
313. See, e.g., H.R. 1815,105th Cong. §§ 202-203 (1997).
314. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 42-44. HHS had advocated a
similar approach during previous health confidentiality debates. See Hearings on S. 1360,
supra note 54, at 97 (statement of Nan Hunter, Deputy General Counsel, HHS). In its
1997 report to HHS, the NCVHS agreed with the statutory approach. See NCVHS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 8-9. This approach is already in use in several
states, including California, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.10(a), (c)(1)-(3) (West 1982 &
Supp. 1998), Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-16-529(1)-(3) (1997), and
Washington, see WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.02.050(1)(a)-(c) (West 1992 & Supp.
1998).
315. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 9.
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administrative burdens on the routine practice of health care.316
Physicians could disclose necessary information to other providers,
such as a specialist to whom the patient is referred, without having to
obtain written consent, and authorization would not be required for
the transmission of information between providers and third-party
payers.317 Because many different electronic claims processors may
handle the flow of computerized information between provider and
payer, and because the identity of these organizations cannot
necessarily be determined in advance,318 it would be difficult, the
Administration asserts, for providers to satisfy the requirements of a
valid authorization under any proposed legislation.319  The
Administration's plan would also provide an "opt-out" provision.
Patients could prohibit the disclosure of certain information for
treatment or payment purposes or could restrict the disclosure of this
information to certain persons.320
While managed care organizations support the statutory
authorization concept,321 doctors and privacy advocates have
expressed serious concerns. 31 The Administration's proposal runs
counter to the principle of informed consent, they argue, because it
implies that affirmative consent is essentially meaningless and thus an
unnecessary burden for providers and payers who believe they have a
"right" to patients' information.3z Furthermore, they contend, the
statutory authorization plan would be no less burdensome than
316. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 43.
317. See id.
318. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 107 (statement of Jeanne Schultz Scott
on behalf of the Association for Electronic Health Care Transactions).
319. See id. at 110. Most health confidentiality legislation imposes detailed
requirements for each valid authorization request, including a specification or description
of the information to be disclosed, the purpose of the disclosure, the entity or individual
to whom the data will be disclosed, and subsequent disclosures that the recipient intends
to make. See, e.g., H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 202(a) (1997). HHS suggested that forcing
providers and payers to meet these requirements each time information is transmitted by
electronic claims agents would "bring the health care payment system to a halt." HHS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 43.
320. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 43-44.
321. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 90-92 (prepared
statement of John T. Nielsen on behalf of the American Association of Health Plans)
(suggesting ways in which the statutory authorization proposal could be improved to
assist managed care organizations).
322. See id. at 103 (prepared statement of Donald J. Palmisano on behalf of the
American Medical Association); id. at 111 (prepared statement of Wanda Walker on
behalf of the Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities); id. at 132 (prepared statement of
the American Psychiatric Association).
323. l at 103 (prepared statement of Donald J. Palmisano on behalf of the American
Medical Association).
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current practice because permitting patients to "opt out" will be
effective only if the provider enumerates all possible kinds of
disclosures. 24  While acknowledging problems associated with
"ritualized" patient authorizations, these groups assert that codifying
authorization is not the best, or even a proper, way to address this
issue.325
2. Disclosure for Research Purposes
One of the most contested areas in the confidentiality debate is
access by researchers to individuals' health information. Within this
issue, certain sub-issues are largely settled. Most proposals for a
uniform federal law agree that researchers should be required, as
soon as possible, to remove all identifiers from the health data they
receive unless an institutional review board ("IRB")326 permits
retention.327 The proposals also restrict researchers' ability to
redisclose personally identifiable information. For example, broad
consensus exists among legislators and interested groups that
information obtained for research purposes should not be used
against a record-subject in any administrative, civil, or criminal
324. See id.; id. at 111 (prepared statement of Wanda Walker on behalf of the
Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities).
325. See id. at 103 (prepared statement of Donald J. Palmisano on behalf of the
American Medical Association).
326. Every proposed research project involving human subjects that is conducted,
funded, or regulated by a federal agency must receive the approval of an IRB. See 45
C.F.R. § 46.109 (1997). The purpose of an IRB is to "safeguard[] the rights and welfare of
human subjects" through external oversight of research projects. Id. § 46.107(a). Each
IRB must consist of at least five persons drawn from varying backgrounds. See id. At
least one of the five must have a scientific background and at least one must have a non-
scientific background. See id. § 46.107(c). At least one member must not be affiliated
with the research institution to which the IRB is attached. See id. § 46.107(d). To
approve a proposed research project, the IRB must determine that risks to the human
subjects have been minimized; the risks are "reasonable in relation to [the] anticipated
benefits" of the research; the selection of the human subjects is equitable; informed
consent has been obtained; and, adequate precautions have been taken to protect the
confidentiality of the human subjects and the data about them. Id. § 46.111. Many
private sector institutions engaged in human research have established IRBs that follow
similar guidelines. See LOWRANCE, supra note 66, at 41. There are approximately 3500
IRBs in the United States today. See id. For criticism of IRBs, see infra notes 347-48 and
accompanying text.
327. See S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 222(h)(1) (1997); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 210(d)(1)
(1997); HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 52. There are several reasons why
an IRB might permit a researcher to retain identifiers: questions may arise about the
integrity of the research, follow-up research may be needed, or analysis of pharmaceutical
and medical device side effects may be required. See Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27,
at 119 (statement of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America);
LOWRANCE, supra note 66, at 36.
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proceeding."z
The principal issue that remains unsettled is whether researchers
should be required to obtain an individual's informed consent to
access identifiable data about that individual. Federal regulations
already govern research involving human subjects that is conducted,
supported, or regulated by federal agencies. 329  These regulations,
collectively known as the Federal Common Rule ("Common Rule"),
generally require researchers to obtain an individual's informed
consent before conducting research involving that individual.31
There are, however, limitations on this requirement. The regulations
do not apply if the research involves only "the collection or study of
existing data, documents, [or] records" about the individual and the
information is publicly available or recorded in such a way that the
identity of the individual cannot be directly or indirectly
determined.33' Even if the last two conditions are not met, informed
consent is still not required if an IRB waives the requirement after
finding that the research poses only minimal risk to the individual;
failure to obtain consent will not "adversely affect the rights and
welfare" of the individual; obtaining consent would be impractical;
and, if possible, the individual will be notified at a later time. 3
32
Several approaches to the informed consent issue have been
proposed. One alternative is to incorporate the Common Rule or its
principles in the health confidentiality statute. Senator Jeffords
would permit non-consensual disclosure of data only to research
projects conducted or supported by a federal agency that comply with
the Common Rule itself,333 while the Clinton Administration would
328. See, e.g., S. 1368 § 222(i); H.R. 1815 § 210(d)(2); H.R. 52, 105th Cong. § 116(b)(2)
(1997); HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 52. The House Committee on
Government Operations asserted that "[t]his absolute protection is an essential part of
the bargain that permits use of records by researchers." H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at
126 (1994). For discussion of law enforcement's demands for health information, see
infra notes 415-17 and accompanying text.
329. See Basic HIHS Policy for Protection of Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124
(1997). Similarly, research regulated by the Food and Drug Administration is governed
by 21 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.27, 56.101-.124 (1997).
330. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
331. Id. § 46.101(b)(4).
332. Id. § 46.116(d).
333. See S. 1921, 105th Cong. § 208(a)(1) (1998). The Jeffords bill would also permit
disclosure of data to research projects that are "not subject to the Federal Policy for the
Protection of Human Subjects." Id. § 208(a)(3). Because research not conducted,
funded, or regulated by the federal government falls outside the Policy, see 45 C.F.R.
§ 46.101(a), the Jeffords bill would apparently allow non-consensual disclosure of health
information, without any showing of need, to research projects that are completely
privately funded and not subject to government regulation.
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permit non-consensual disclosure of data to all research projects,
federally funded or otherwise, which comply with principles derived
from the Common RuleM The Administration recommends, for
example, that the non-consensual disclosure of identifiable health
data be permitted if conducting the research with anonymized data
would be impractical; the research project has been approved by an
IRB "organized and operated in a manner consistent with" the
Common Rule; and the IRB has determined that consent is not
necessary because the benefits of the project outweigh the privacy
intrusion, the research poses minimal risk, the failure to obtain
consent does not "adversely affect the rights and welfare" of the
individuals, and obtaining consent would make it impractical to carry
out the research.335
An alternative approach incorporates both outside review and a
contractual obligation. Representative Shays's proposal would
permit the non-consensual disclosure of archival health
information,336 so long as the researcher's request for the data is
approved by a "board, committee, or other group formally
designated by the [data holder] to review requests for such
information, in accordance with written standards for confidentiality
that specify permissible and impermissible uses of such information
for health research," and the data holder "enters into a written
agreement with the health researcher" that mandates compliance
with Shays's other proposed re-disclosure and use restrictions.337 A
breach of the agreement "may provide a basis for civil action against
the researcher" or could result in "other adverse consequences.
338
As Representative Shays has not defined what a "board, committee,
or other group" and "other adverse consequences" are, it is not clear
what kind of protection this proposal would offer to archived data,
334. Senator Leahy has taken a similar approach but would use regulations
promulgated by HHS. See S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 222(a) (1997). He would also require
the Secretary of HHS to report back to Congress after one year with reconmendations
concerning the advisability of requiring informed consent. See id. § 222(b).
335. HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 52. Representative Condit's latest
proposal would impose a similar requirement. See H.R. 52,105th Cong. § 116(a) (1997).
336. "Archival" patient information is that which was "previously created or collected
by the [data holder] and maintained by the [data holder] in an archive or other
repository." H.R. 3900, 105th Cong. § 106(a) (1998). It is not clear that this explanation
provides a clear distinction between "archived" information and other data, for which the
Shays proposal would require traditional IRB approval for non-consensual disclosure.
See id. § 101(1)(B)(vi)(I). For instance, would "archived" data include data that have
been held for only one week--or even one day?
337. Id. § 106(a)(2), (3).
338. Id. § 106(a)(4).
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though it is certainly possible that it would be even less than that
conferred by the IRB process.339
A final approach, one supported by patient-rights groups and the
privacy community, is to forbid outright the non-consensual use of
identifiable health data for research purposes.340 Advocates advance
three arguments in support of a consent requirement. First, the
purported need for individually identifiable information for health
research is questionable; much health research can be accomplished
by using aggregated data without patient identifiers, so easy access to
identifiable data is not justified.341 Second, the principle of individual
autonomy dictates that informed consent is a necessary predicate for
all health research involving humans, including that which uses only
records. 2 The first element of the Nuernberg Code, one advocate
has noted,343 stipulates that in medical research, "[t]he voluntary
consent of the human subject is absolutely essential." Failure to
require patient authorization, this advocate has agreed, threatens the
"constitutional guarantees of individual liberty.' ' 45 Finally, privacy
advocates argue that privacy is too important a right for its protection
to be left to IRBs. 346 These committees are normally affiliated with
the researcher's organization and are "likely to share the
339. Privacy advocates have criticized the Shays proposal for this very reason. See
ACLU, supra note 193, at 1. The Shays proposal raises, and apparently provides one
answer to, the question whether patients have a lesser privacy interest in old
information-which is presumably "archived"--than in current information.
340. See H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 210(a) (1997) (sponsored by Rep. McDermott);
Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, ACLU, to Senator Robert Bennett 1 (Oct. 27,
1995) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
341. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 86 (statement of the Public Citizen's
Health Research Group).
342- See, e.g., James Pyles, Testimony on Behalf of the National Coalition for Patient
Rights Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital
and Health Statistics 84 (Jan. 13, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (arguing for a consent requirement because "there is very little
difference between asking a person directly and getting the information indirectly"). But
see PRIVACY COMISSION, supra note 19, at 309 (noting that the argument for requiring
patient authorization for use of health records for research "has always seemed less
compelling" than the obligation to obtain consent for research on humans).
343. See Nagel Statement, supra note 193, at 4.
344. 2 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at
181-82 (1946-49).
345. Denise M. Nagel, Testimony on Behalf of the National Coalition for Patient
Rights et al. Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on
Vital and Health Statistics 4 (Feb. 19, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).




[researcher's] values concerning the importance of research at the
expense of personal privacy."'  Furthermore, observers note, IRBs
have questionable experience addressing privacy issues because
confidentiality of data has traditionally not been their primary
concern.m
Health researchers respond that there is a legitimate need to
access non-anonymized data. Research sometimes requires
individually identifiable data349 or, more frequently, data that are
linkable to a specific individual.350  These identifiers and linkages
enable researchers to avoid duplication of records and to track the
progress of an individual's medical condition or the consequences of
treatment over time.351 Researchers also claim that requiring consent
to access these records will impede beneficial research. 2 Obtaining
consent can be impractical if not impossible in many cases. Research
often involves hundreds or even thousands of health records; tracking
down every individual to obtain authorization would be an enormous
burden.353 In many cases, research is conducted retrospectively, and
consent cannot be obtained because individuals have died or can no
347. Id. There is some support for this criticism. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at
127 (1994) ("IRBs are not independent of the institutions that created them. The
inherent conflict of interest is particularly strong when an IRB reviews research with
commercial potential for the institution or company at which the IRB is located."). Only
one member of an IRB must not be affiliated with the sponsoring institution. See supra
note 326.
348. Even some supporters of non-consensual disclosure of data for research purposes
concede that "IRBs have not historically focused on issues of confidentiality." Hearing
on S. 1368, supra note 156, at 70 (statement of the Consortium for Citizens with
Disabilities); see also LOWRANCE, supra note 66, at 42 (questioning whether IRBs "have
been attending as vigorously to privacy risks as they have to physical and emotional
risks"). But see Hoge Testimony, supra note 166, at 58 (arguing that IRB's have done "a
wonderful job ... protecting patients"); Donald J. Palmisano, Statement on Behalf of the
American Medical Association Before Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the
Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 58 (Feb. 18, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Palmisano Statement] (suggesting
that most researchers and patients are "generally satisfied" that IRBs provide adequate
protection for the confidentiality of health information).
349. See Hearing on S. 1368, supra note 156, at 80 (statement of the Biotechnology
Industry Organization).
350. See, e.g., David Korn, Testimony on Behalf of the Association of American
Medical Colleges Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l
Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 13, 15 (Jan. 13, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review).
351. See, e.g., LOWRANCE, supra note 66, at 36.
352. See, e.g., Robert A. Hiatt, Testimony on Behalf of the American College of
Epidemiology Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm.
on Vital and Health Statistics 6-7 (Jan. 13, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Hiatt Testimony].
353. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 54.
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longer be located.3 5 4 The unavailability of these records could raise
doubts about the strength of the research. Because those individuals
who could not be located might differ in some significant respect
from those whose records are included, respondent bias might
compromise the research results. 55 The same problem would occur,
researchers claim, if individuals who could be found refused to
provide consent.
3 16
After considering arguments on the informed consent issue from
both researchers and privacy advocates, the NCVHS concluded that
an absolute consent requirement would not be advisable,357 stating its
belief that to impose such a requirement would add an "impractical
and expensive" burden on researchers and, consequently, would
significantly reduce the amount of research conducted for the
ultimate benefit of the public. 358  The Committee cited the
requirement of prior IRB approval, the prohibition on using the data
against the individual in administrative and criminal proceedings, and
a requirement that researchers remove all identifiers when feasible as
sufficient to protect patient privacy.359
3. Disclosure for Public Health Purposes
Confidentiality issues pertaining to public health data engender
somewhat less controversy than those that surround the use of data
by medical researchers. 6 A probable explanation for this distinction
is that the concept of public health is less abstract than traditional
research and its benefits are more easily visualized.361 The public is
354. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 71-72 (statement of
Elizabeth B. Andrews, M.D., on behalf of the Healthcare Leadership Council); HHS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 54. One prominent example of retrospective
research in recent years involved an investigation into why young women were
developing a rare form of vaginal cancer at 15 to 20 years of age. The investigation
required researchers to track down and access the mothers' medical records to determine
what drugs, if any, were used during pregnancy. The drug DES was identified as the
cause of the cancer. According to researchers, this investigation would have been difficult
to complete had the mothers' consent been required. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at
121 (1994).
355. See, e.g., Hiatt Testimony, supra note 352, at 7.
356. See, e.g., id. at 12. To explain respondent bias, Dr. Hiatt drew an analogy to
reactions to phone calls from direct marketers: some persons will hang up-that is, they
do not consent to participate-while others listen. Those who hang up, Dr. Hiatt noted,
are different from those who choose to listen. See id.
357. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 12.
358. Id.
359. See id.




more likely to support the use of personally identifiable data for
public health functions than for traditional medical research,362 and
the deferential treatment accorded public health agencies is evident
in many of the proposals for a federal confidentiality law. 63
While aggregated data are often sufficient for public health
purposes, agencies must frequently use personally identifiable
information to carry out certain functions. 6" Charged with creation
of an official public record, public health agencies monitor and
record births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and other vital statistics. 5
In compliance with state reporting laws, they collect reports provided
by doctors and hospitals of certain communicable diseases and other
health conditions. 6  In addition to the passive collection of data,
agencies conduct public health surveillance, looking proactively for
emerging diseases and outbreaks of disease, patterns of morbidity,
and trends in risky behaviors. 67 As a result of their data collection
and surveillance duties, agencies must sometimes use identifiable
information to act affirmatively for the public health. For example,
an agency may be authorized by law to contact individuals who may
have been exposed to communicable diseases so that appropriate
treatment can be administered.
3 6
362. See id.
363. See infra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.
364. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 119 (1994).
365. See, e.g., David Fleming, Testimony on Behalf of the Council of State and
Territorial Epidemiologists Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the
Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 40 (Jan. 13, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Fleming Testimony].
366. All 50 states have enacted statutes that require health care providers to report
certain individually identifiable data to public health authorities; consent of the patient is
not required. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 27-28, 34. Traditionally, these
"reporting statutes" were grouped into four categories: birth and death statistics,
infectious and communicable diseases, child abuse, and gunshot and pointed object
wounds. See WESTIN, supra note 191, at 21-22. States continue to add new reporting
requirements, such as laws mandating reports of elder abuse. See Schwartz, supra note
12, at 321.
367. Surveillance is one of the oldest functions of public health. See LOWRANCE,
supra note 66, at 22. Increasingly, the scope of surveillance extends beyond the
traditional identification of disease to include environmental risks and personal behaviors
such as smoking, drug use, and use of seatbelts. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 28.
368. See, e.g., Fleming Testimony, supra note 365, at 40-41. For example, 37 states
have laws providing for the notification of a spouse or partner of possible exposure to a
sexually transmittable disease. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 36. Those so
notified are normally not informed of the identity of the source of possible exposure. See
id. at 82. For analysis of confidentiality issues pertaining to notification of possible HIV
exposure, see id. at 82-89; Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Piercing the Veil of
Secrecy in HIVIAIDS and Other Sexually Transmitted Diseases: Theories of Privacy and
Disclosure in Partner Notification, 5 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 9 (1998). For an
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Protection of public health has traditionally been a duty of the
states.369  Identifiable data about individuals are, however,
increasingly collected and maintained in regional and national public
health databanks.370 As one report has noted, "[t]he development of
a public health information infrastructure is not a distant concept, but
an emerging reality."371 The U.S. Public Health Service, for example,
is developing an automated system that will link state databases
across the country,37 and several federal agencies are collaborating in
the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey
("NHANES"), which has been described as the "most ambitious
public effort to create a population-based database."373 In the latest
round of NHANES, more than 8000 pieces of health-related data will
be collected from each of approximately 30,000 individuals through
interviews and examinations.374 Public health experts analyze the
data concerning these individuals in an effort to improve health
outcomes for the larger population in the United States and
abroad.375 The data collected through the survey are subject to strict
federal confidentiality protections, including a prohibition on
redisclosure of identifiable information without the consent of the
individual.376 If consent is given, disclosure is permitted only to other
federal agencies. 77
Reflecting the predominant state role in public health, most
existing confidentiality protections concerning public health data
have been enacted or promulgated at the state level . 7  The 1996
survey of state health confidentiality laws found a patchwork of often
dissimilar rules. Every state but one has created statutory or
regulatory protection for public health information generally, and
forty-two states have specific protections for communicable diseases
analysis and recommendations concerning the confidentiality of HIV-related information
in the public health context generally, see Roger Doughty, Comment, The Confidentiality
of HIV-Related Information: Responding to the Resurgence of Aggressive Public Health
Interventions in the AIDS Epidemic, 82 CAL. L. REv. 111 (1994).
369. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 13.
370. See GOSTiN ET AL., supra note 143, at 29.
371. Id. The "public health infrastructure" is defined as the "framework that
undergirds the electronic information collection, storage, use, and transmission
supporting the essential functions of the public health system." Id. at 16.
372 See id. at 29.
373. Id. at 29-30.




378. See GoSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 1-6.
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and sexually transmitted diseases.3 79 These statutes and regulations
differ dramatically in the ease with which they permit redisclosure of
data. 0
Despite these discrepancies, public health officials have
expressed concern about replacing the present system of state laws
with uniform federal guidelines.38 ' They note that decisions
concerning the balance between individual privacy and public health
needs have traditionally been made at the state level and argue that
this tradition should continue.312 Citing their excellent track record
of safeguarding data, officials suggest that the existing system of state
public health confidentiality laws works well.3  Although reporting,
surveillance, and confidentiality guidelines vary from state to state,
public health agencies are comfortable with the long-standing laws
that currently apply in their respective states.3 4 Any effort to impose
new federal rules designed to alter significantly the status quo would,
they argue, "create a fair amount of at least temporary chaos" in the
public health community.3s
All of the proposals for a uniform federal law would provide
baseline standards for confidentiality protection, and to the extent
that existing state laws concerning public health data do not meet
these standards, the federal law would preempt state law 86 Mindful,
however, of the traditional role of states in protecting the public
health, the proposals make allowances for state public health laws.
Under almost all proposals, even those that would otherwise impose
379. See id at 33-34.
380. See id. at 37-38.
381. See Fleming Testimony, supra note 365, at 41. But see Gellman, supra note 87, at
148 (suggesting that there has been "no visible opposition" to federal preemption by state
agencies).
382. See Fleming Testimony, supra note 365, at 41.
383. See id. Public health agencies have established a commendable record of
safeguarding the individually identifiable data they receive. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601,
pt. 5, at 120 (1994). One dramatic exception to this record occurred in Tampa, Florida, in
1996, when a state employee copied the names of almost 4000 FHV positive and AIDS
patients from a Pinellas County Health Department computer to a disk and mailed the
disk to two major newspapers. See Sue Landry, AIDS List Is Out-State Investigating
Leak, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 20,1996, at Al.
384. See Fleming Testimony, supra note 365, at 55 (arguing that a federal
confidentiality law "could create a lot of problems at the individual state level" for public
health because "rules, regulations, [and] practices ... have evolved around how the
[state] laws are currently worded").
385. Id.
386. See, e.g., S. 1921, 105th Cong. § 401(a)-(c) (1998); S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 401(a)
(1997); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 402(a) (1997); HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
155, at 15-17.
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a "ceiling" on confidentiality protections, more stringent state laws
concerning public health functions would be exempt from the federal
confidentiality statute.3 7 This deferential treatment of existing state-
level protections reflects not only the wishes of state public health
officials but also the position of the privacy community. Privacy
advocates insist that a comprehensive federal law must permit states
to pass more stringent confidentiality laws generally, including laws
protecting public health data.3 8 An obvious beneficiary of this
approach is HIV-related information, which already enjoys stringent
confidentiality protection in some states, in certain cases surpassing
anything proposed at the federal level. 89
According to privacy advocates, the need for states to create
stronger protections is underscored by what the advocates claim are
the inadequate confidentiality requirements some proposals would
impose on public health agencies. 90 The Clinton Administration's
recommendations, for example, would give public health agencies
broad access to identifiable health information. Non-consensual
disclosure of data to public health agencies would be permitted for
any lawful "disease or injury reporting, public health surveillance, or
public health investigation or intervention. '391  Privacy advocates
claim that such a proposal would make it too easy for public health
agencies to obtain identifiable information because agencies would
not be required to demonstrate a need for the data.39 Some
advocates have even argued that non-consensual access be strictly
limited to situations in which the public health agency can establish a
"specific nexus" between the need to obtain identifiable information
and a threat of harm or death to one or more persons. 93 While the
387. See, e.g., S. 1368 § 401(a); H.R. 1815 § 402(a); S. 1360, 104th Cong. § 401(a),
(c)(1), (c)(3) (1995).
388. See infra notes 504-11 and accompanying text.
389. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 77; see also Robert Gellman, Testimony
Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and
Health Statistics 55 (Jan. 13, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Gellman Testimony] (suggesting that the exception
from preemption for state public health laws "was an attempt to leave state AIDS laws
alone").
390. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 145 (statement of the Consumer
Project on Technology).
391. HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 48. Senator Bennett's health
confidentiality legislation in the 104th Congress contained a similar provision. See S. 1360
§ 208 (1995).
392. Cf. Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 87 (statement of the Public Citizen's
Health Research Group) (criticizing a similar provision in S. 1360 for not requiring public
health agencies to show why they need identifiable data).
393. Memorandum from Chai Feldblum & Janlori Goldman to Working Group on S.
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more stringent legislative proposals have incorporated the "specific
nexus" concept, they do not attempt to define what it means;394 it is
unclear how much more restrictive such a requirement would be in
practice. 95 Furthermore, recent proposals vary dramatically on the
issue of subsequent disclosure of data by public health agencies, from
imposing no restrictions to permitting disclosures only for purposes
related to public health reporting, surveillance, investigation, and
intervention.
396
4. Disclosure for Oversight Purposes
Access to identifiable health data by oversight organizations
remains one of the most contentious issues in the effort to enact a
federal law.397  Functions traditionally associated with oversight
include cost containment efforts, quality assurance reviews,
utilization of resource studies, anti-fraud investigations, licensure of
physicians and other providers, and accreditation of health care
institutions.3 98 Accrediting bodies, such as the Joint Commission on
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, and licensing bodies,
such as state medical boards, are important mechanisms for ensuring
certain standards of proficiency and safety in the provision of care. 99
Oversight activities are also a principal means for curbing spiraling
health care costs, particularly when these costs are driven by fraud
and waste. HITS conducts audits, for example, to detect abuses of the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.4"0 Similarly, law enforcement
agencies and state insurance commissioners investigate charges of
overbilling and other forms of fraud.40' While oversight activities
often require only anonymized or aggregated data, access to
individually identifiable patient records is frequently necessary. 02
1360, supra note 230, at 9 (noting such a proposal by the ACLU of Massachusetts).
394. S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 212(a) (1997); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 209(a) (1997).
395. Cf. NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 13 (characterizing public
health access provisions in most proposals as "broad and mostly undefined").
396. S. 1360, introduced in the 104th Congress, would have imposed no restrictions on
the further use or disclosure of data by public health agencies. See S. 1360 § 208. The
Administration recommends that subsequent disclosures be limited to health care, public
health, research, and oversight purposes. See H-S RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155,
at 49. The most recent McDermott bill would limit redisclosures to purposes of public
health reporting, surveillance, investigation, and intervention. See H.R. 1815 § 209(c).
397. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 13.
398. See HS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 45-46.
399. See, e.g., OTA, supra note 12, at 47.
400. See, e.g., HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 46.
401. See id.
402. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 13.
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Legislative proposals vary in the extent to which they would
permit disclosure of data for oversight purposes. Many proposals,
including the Clinton Administration's recommendations, assert a
legitimate need for access by permitting non-consensual disclosure in
certain situations,40 3 but many privacy advocates strenuously object
and call for a consent requirement or at least notice to the patient.
4 4
The privacy community has also criticized previous proposals for
defining "oversight" broadly, arguing that an expansive definition
will permit an indeterminable number of organizations to access
data.45  There is some basis for this criticism. Because oversight
activities "are hard[] to classify or even identify," the NCVHS found
that legislative proposals usually define the term loosely for fear that
a legitimate activity will be excluded.4 6 An expansive definition of
"oversight" can be problematic because, under all proposals, the
ability to access data without consent depends on the use to which
the data will be applied. If a purpose appears to qualify for more
than one category of use as defined by the legislation, which
confidentiality rules apply?40
An example of this problem in the health oversight context is the
403. See, e.g., S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 214 (1997); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. §§ 207-208
(1997); S. 1360, 104th Cong. § 206 (1995); HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at
44-45.
404. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 145 (statement of the Consumer
Project on Technology). The Clinton Administration has recommended that non-
consensual disclosure of identifiable data be permitted if authorized by any other law "for
oversight of the health care system." HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 44.
Other legislative proposals are significantly more restrictive. For example, one proposal
would require a showing of probable cause that fraud has been committed and that the
individually identifiable data are necessary to investigate this fraud, or that the data are
necessary to investigate possible incidents of "abuse, neglect, or exploitation of an
individual." H.R. 1815 § 207(a). This proposal would also require oversight agencies to
notify "at the first practical opportunity" individuals who are not the targets of an
investigation that their health records have been accessed and to explain the reasons for
unconsented access. Id. § 207(c).
405. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 87 (statement of Public Citizen's
Health Research Group).
406. NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 13. A typical definition of an
oversight agency is one who "performs or oversees the performance of an assessment,
investigation, or prosecution relating to ... compliance with legal or fiscal standards
pertinent to health care fraud ... [or] the protection of individuals from harm, abuse,
neglect, or exploitation" and is a public agency, acts on behalf of an agency, acts in
compliance with an agency requirement, or acts with authorization of federal or state law.
H.R. 1815 § 3(8).
407. It has been suggested that users of health information will attempt to characterize
themselves "in the most benign manner" so that they will face the least stringent access




HHS Inspector General, who is responsible for investigating fraud in
the Medicare and Medicaid programs.4 8  Pursuant to this
responsibility, the Inspector has the statutory power to compel by
subpoena the production of any individual's health record.4 9
However, because the Inspector uses information contained in these
records to aid criminal prosecutions for fraud, it is unclear whether
exercising this power would be considered an "oversight" or a "law
enforcement" activity for purposes of the confidentiality law.
410
Although it may be impossible to draw such a distinction in practice,
legislative proposals attempt to do so in theory, and the result is
uncertainty as to which procedures must be followed to access
identifiable health information without consent-those applicable to
oversight agencies or those applicable to law enforcement.41 ' This
problem led the NCVHS to caution that "treating so many different
functions and users under the same 'oversight' category should be
avoided" and that "[m]ore study is needed to draw useful distinctions
between [oversight and other] activities and to find better and
narrow[er] definitions of legitimate uses and users. ' 412 The Clinton
Administration's response to the Inspector General problem is to
require investigative agencies and officials to continue to satisfy
existing access procedures stipulated by statute as a prerequisite to
compelling the production of records.413 As discussed in the
following section, however, this requirement provides little comfort
to privacy advocates.414
5. Disclosure for Law Enforcement Purposes
Law enforcement agencies seek access to identifiable health
information primarily for two purposes. First, agencies and
prosecutors rely on individual patient records when investigating
408. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 13.
409. See Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. § 6(a)(4) (1994).
410. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 90 (1994) (noting that the Inspector General
has both "oversight and law enforcement roles" and that detection of fraud will lead to
"criminal and civil prosecutions and administrative sanctions").
411. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 14.
412. Id. As one congressional staff aide has observed, definitional issues are the
source of "'ninety percent'" of the unresolved disagreements related to a health
confidentiality law. Records Privacy Law Won't Be Done This Congress, Hill Aides Say,
HEALTH LEGIS. & REG. WKLY., Jan. 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10395658 (quoting
an unidentified congressional staff member).
413. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 48.
414. See infra notes 429-33 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of law
enforcement's present ability to access health information).
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potential cases of fraud in the health care industry.415 Although
providers and payers are the usual targets of such investigations,
patient records must be reviewed to confirm the fraudulent activity
and to build a sufficient amount of evidence.416 Second, law
enforcement officials also use health information to further
investigations of specific individuals unrelated to fraudulent
activity.
417
Law enforcement officials generally use compulsory process, in
the form of a warrant or subpoena, to obtain patients' medical
records. 418  States differ in their requirements for obtaining
subpoenas, with some states requiring prior judicial approval to issue
certain subpoenas and others imposing no such requirement.419
Federal law enforcement officials use a search warrant when the
party under investigation holds the information sought; otherwise,
federal agents normally use grand jury subpoenas to access medical
records." To obtain a subpoena, federal law enforcement officials
need only to convince a prosecutor that the information sought is
relevant to the scope of a pending grand jury investigation.421
Satisfied that the information is relevant, the prosecutor drafts and
signs the subpoena, and law enforcement officials serve it. 42 No
judicial oversight is required unless the recipient of the subpoena
refuses to disclose the information, in which case officials must seek a
415. See Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General, Prepared Statement
on Behalf of the U.S. Department of Justice Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and
Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 1 (Feb. 18, 1997)
(unpublished statement, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
416. See id.
417. See id. For example, in a hostage situation, police could access the captor's
medical records to learn of any history of mental illness. See id. at 2.
418. See Robert S. Litt, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Testimony on Behalf of
the U.S. Dep't of Justice Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l
Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 10 (Feb. 18, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file
with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Litt Testimony].
419. See id. at 10-11.
420. See id. at 10. Depending on the nature of the investigation, an administrative
subpoena may be used instead of a grand jury subpoena. See PRIVACY COMMISSION,
supra note 19, at 367. Various statutes authorize federal agencies with investigative
responsibilities to use subpoenas to compel the disclosure of information without prior
judicial review. See id. For example, when investigating a health care offense, the U.S.
Attorney General has statutory authority to demand by subpoena the disclosure of any
medical record. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486 (West Supp. 1998). Administrative subpoenas
raise privacy concerns similar to those raised by grand jury subpoenas. See PRIVACY
COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 367-72.




court order to compel disclosure.423 The recipient can then challenge
the subpoena before the court on the basis of some legally protected
interest in the requested information;424 however, if the subpoena has
been served on a third party (a doctor, for example) for the purpose
of obtaining records pertaining to an individual patient, that patient
may not have the necessary standing to issue a challenge.425 The
ability to challenge the subpoena is, moreover, predicated on
knowledge of its existence. Grand jury subpoenas have no notice
requirement, so patients may not be aware that law enforcement
officials have obtained personal information from their doctor or
hospital.426  Finally, no guarantee exists that information obtained
pursuant to the subpoena will even be used for the purpose for which
it was obtained. Although evidence shown to a grand jury is sealed
for secrecy, prosecutors sometimes choose not to show evidence to
the grand jury.' If the health information is not sealed, law
enforcement officials could potentially use it for other investigative
purposes.42s
The ease with which federal law enforcement officials obtain
health information was criticized as early as 1977 by the Privacy
Protection Study Commission ("Privacy Commission"). 429  The
Privacy Commission found that the subpoena had become "little
more than an administrative tool" by which law enforcement could
access individuals' records without having to satisfy the probable
cause standard of a search warrant.43 This criticism has since been
echoed by at least one court431 and noted by Congress.432 The Privacy
423. See PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 366-67. The American Psychiatric
Association urges its members to ignore subpoenas and to wait for a court order before
turning over patient records. See Hoge Testimony, supra note 166, at 67.
424. See PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 366.
425. See id. As noted previously, the courts have been reluctant to recognize
individuals' protected interest in information held about themselves by a third-party. See
supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Miller and its
possible application to health-related information).
426. See PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 366-67.
427. See id. at 376-77; Litt Testimony, supra note 418, at 38. Law enforcement officials
have expressed a willingness to accept a federal law that would require health records
obtained by grand jury subpoena to be shown to the grand jury. See Litt Testimony, supra
note 418, at 8. Federal law already imposes such a requirement for financial records
obtained by grand jury subpoena. See 12 U.S.C. § 3420(a) (1994).
428. Use of the health information evidence by federal agencies would still be
governed by the Privacy Act; however, as previously noted, the Act is riddled with
exceptions. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
429. See PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 366-77.
430. Id. at 377.
431. See Thurman v. Texas, 861 S.W.2d 96, 101 (Tex. App. 1993, no writ) (Cohen, J.,
concurring) ("The unrestricted use of grand jury subpoenas to obtain medical records is a
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Commission called for a statutory solution that would place stringent
limitations on the use of grand jury subpoenas to access medical
information.433
Heeding this recommendation, most health privacy legislative
proposals have incorporated restrictions of varying strengths to
access by law enforcement. Senator Bennett's initial proposal in 1995
would have imposed relatively modest restrictions, requiring law
enforcement agencies to show probable cause that the desired health
data are "relevant" to an investigation.434 More recent proposals,
however, would impose even more stringent requirements. 435 For
example, legislation introduced by Senator Leahy would require law
enforcement officials to obtain a court order to access health data
and would condition this order on a showing by clear and convincing
evidence that the records are "necessary to a legitimate law
enforcement inquiry into a particular violation of criminal law," that
the investigation cannot rely on non-identifiable data, and that the
need to obtain the data "outweighs the privacy interest of the
individual."436
Another feature common to confidentiality proposals is a
requirement that the agency serve notice on the individual whose
records are sought, either prior to the execution of the court order or
subpoena or, in some proposals, within a specified time following
execution, and that this individual have an opportunity to challenge
access. 437 In some bills, the notice requirement could be excused if
law enforcement could make an adequate showing that providing
notice would risk the destruction of evidence. 438 Most bills would
also prohibit the use of health-related information indicating criminal
serious threat to privacy. There is almost no limit on what can be obtained without the
knowledge or approval of any court, any grand jury,... or the person affected.").
432. See H.R. REP. No. 103-601, pt. 5, at 135-36 (1994).
433. See PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 378.
434. S. 1360, 104th Cong. § 212(a) (1995).
435. See, e.g., S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 215(a)-(b) (1997); H.R. 1815, 105th Cong.
§ 213(b) (1997).
436. S. 1368 § 215(a)-(b) (emphasis added).
437. See, e.g., S. 1368 § 215(c) (requiring prior notice to the individual unless the court
determines that his whereabouts are unknown or there is a risk that the evidence is
unavailable or will be destroyed); H.R. 1815 § 213(d)(3)-(4) (requiring a law enforcement
agency to notify an individual within 30 days that the agency has obtained by warrant
protected health information concerning that individual and permitting the individual to
file a motion to quash); S. 1360 § 212(a)(3)-(4) (requiring a law enforcement agency to
notify an individual within 30 days that the agency has obtained protected health
information by warrant and requiring prior or concurrent notification if a subpoena or
summons is used to obtain the information).
438. See, e.g., S. 1368 § 215(c)(2).
[Vol. 77
1998] HEALTH INFORMATION PRIVACY 345'
activity by a patient against that patient if discovered during the
course of an investigation not related to the criminal activity.439
Law enforcement officials have sharply criticized these
proposals." ° Introducing new restrictions on access, they charge, will
unduly burden their efforts to obtain and use information necessary
for investigations and successful prosecutions.441 They claim, as an
example, that a warrant requirement to obtain any health data would
hamper investigations because officers often are unable to identify
with necessary specificity the patient records sought."2  Placing
additional requirements on their ability to access records will also
provide defense counsel with opportunities to attack collateral issues
at trial such as procedural violations."3 Furthermore, officials argue,
it is a "perverse" idea to ignore evidence of patients' criminal activity
found while investigating a provider or payer for fraud." Rather
than operate under these conditions, law enforcement officials
demand a complete exemption from any health privacy legislation
enacted by Congress. 445  The current system, officials assert,
adequately protects patients' privacy rights."6 In support of this
proposition, officials note the absence of documented breaches of
patient confidentiality" 7 and suggest that there is little evidence to
indicate that patients do not seek medical care out of fear of access to
records by law enforcement."8
The Clinton Administration's proposal reflects law
439. See, e.g., id. § 215(e); H.R. 1815 § 213(c).
440. See, e.g., Gallagher Testimony, supra note 36, at 3-4.
441. See Litt Testimony, supra note 418, at 8. But see PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra
note 19, at 391 (arguing that law enforcement's "burden argument ... is not totally
convincing").
442. See, e.g., Mike Barnes, Testimony on Behalf of the National District Attorneys
Association Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on
Vital and Health Statistics 5-6 (Feb. 18, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review).
443. See Litt Testimony, supra note 418, at 8.
444. Id.
445. See Gallagher Testimony, supra note 36, at 3.
446. See Litt Testimony, supra note 418, at 8. Personally identifiable information held
by federal lav enforcement agencies is protected by the Privacy Act of 1974, see supra
notes 88-96 and accompanying text, but the Act contains many exemptions, and, in the
view of one commentator, "every law enforcement agency.. . has invoked every available
exemption all the time." Robert Gellman, Chairman Statement, Subcomm. on Privacy
and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 19 (Feb. 18, 1997)
(unpublished transcript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter
Gellman Statement].
447. See Litt Testimony, supra note 418, at 7.
448. See id. at 8.
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enforcement's desire to retain the status quo.449 Its plan would
impose no new restrictions on law enforcement's ability to access,
use, or redisclose identifiable health information.40 Non-consensual
disclosure of patient information to a law enforcement agency would
be permitted as long as the agency "states that the health information
is needed for a legitimate law enforcement inquiry" and complies
with any other existing state or federal laws relating to access, such as
having to obtain a subpoena or seeking prior approval of the
courts.451  Similar provisions would apply to access of health
information by members of the intelligence community.45 The
Administration justifies not imposing new restrictions on the basis
that "[t]hese disclosures are necessary to protect the health care
system and the public, and they comport with certain well-accepted
realities of law enforcement and the criminal justice system. ' 453 It
argues that these recommendations strike the proper balance
between competing public and private interests.4 54
Apparently, everyone but law enforcement disagrees with this
position. Members of Congress, privacy advocates, and the health
care industry have condemned the Administration's
recommendations as a threat to patient privacy, arguing that the
proposal would ensure that law enforcement retains unparalleled
access to medical records.4 55 Privacy advocates, in particular, are
concerned that unless new restrictions are imposed, the increasingly
prevalent use of computer networks and databanks to store health
information will permit law enforcement agencies to search easily
large quantities of patient records for evidence of criminal activity.45 6
449. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 60-61.
450. See id.
451. Id. at 60.
452. See id.
453. Id.
454. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 23-24 (prepared
statement of Donna Shalala, Secretary of HHS).
455. See, e.g., Janlori Goldman, Director, Health Privacy Project, Institute for Health
Care Research and Policy, Georgetown University, Testimony Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources 7 (Feb. 26, 1998) (unpublished transcript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (noting that the Administration's law enforcement proposal
has garnered criticism from "[Capitol] Hill, the media, health care providers, and health
privacy experts"); The Outcry over HHS's Privacy Proposals, HEALTH DATA NETWORK
NEWS, Sept. 20, 1997, at 1-2 (discussing criticism of the Administration's law enforcement
proposal by the ACLU, the American Hospital Association, and members of Congress).
The result of the Administration's plan, one privacy advocacy quipped, would be that
doctors should begin to read patients their Miranda rights. See Privacy in the Electronic
Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 108 (prepared statement of A.G. Breitenstein).
456. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 142-43 (statement of the
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In response to these criticisms, the Administration has
attempted to shift the focus away from an absence of new restrictions
to the proposed imposition of new criminal and civil penalties for
misuse of health information by law enforcement.457 These "severe"
penalties will, it asserts, adequately strengthen privacy protections for
the public.458 The Administration has also downplayed critics'
concerns about computerized fishing expeditions, responding that
imposing restrictions on law enforcement's ability to search
computerized databases of health records would be "premature" at
this time because "more experience ... with the nature and speed of
computerization of these records" is needed.4519
D. Use of Information by Employers
One issue not specifically addressed by many legislative
proposals is access to and use of identifiable health data by
employers.460 In their roles as providers of employee health benefit
plans, direct medical care, and wellness programs, employers
frequently use or have access to employees' health data.46' In an
attempt to regulate costs, for example, self-insured employers
monitor employee treatment and prescription claims approved by
their benefit plan administrators. 462 Employers with in-house medical
divisions provide medical care directly to their employees. 463 Many
employers also require physical exams to determine that employees
may safely carry out their jobs and conduct employee surveys as part
Consumer Project on Technology). For more vivid criticism on this point, see American
Psychiatric Association, supra note 185, at 2 (equating the danger of surveillance of
records by the "police 'paparazzi' "to "giving the police the right of hot pursuit through a
crowded schoolyard"). For an argument why practical considerations will hinder law
enforcement's ability to search computer databases, see Litt Testimony, supra note 418,
at 16.
457. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 9 (testimony of
Donna Shalala, Secretary of HBS) (responding to senators' concerns about law
enforcement access by emphasizing that law enforcement officials "would be covered by
the criminal penalties, and this is the important point that we've made here").
458. Id. at 15.
459. HIS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 61.
460. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 15.
461. See Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 328 (statement of Dr. Martin
Sepulveda of IBM); Richard Kowalski, Testimony on Behalf of General Motors Before
the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health
Statistics 4 (Feb. 3, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter Kowalski Testimony].
462. See Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 328 (statement of Dr. Martin
Sepulveda of IBM).
463. See Kowalski Testimony, supra note 461, at 3-4.
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of wellness programs. 64 Employees are understandably concerned
that employers will use these data for discriminatory purposes,465 so
much so that some workers ask their health care providers to falsify a
diagnosis out of fear that their employer will obtain their record. 466
Employers can effectively use health information in such a way
as to protect employees' privacy.467 For example, payments made by
contract benefits administrators can be monitored using aggregated
claims data, which do not link individual employees with particular
medical conditions,468 and in-house medical staff can explain to
management that an employee-patient must miss work without
revealing the specific medical reason or other protected health
information.469 Many employers have, in fact, voluntarily instituted
internal guidelines designed to protect the confidentiality of
employees' health data.47 IBM, for example, has placed restrictions
on how its contract benefits administrators can use its employees'
health data and requires these administrators to pass treatment and
prescription benefits information to the company in aggregated form
only.471 Similarly, General Motors has instituted a confidentiality
policy that generally prohibits the disclosure of information obtained
by its in-house medical staff without the authorization of the
employee-patient. 472  Employers with such self-imposed
confidentiality policies point out that these restrictions do not
frustrate their efficiency or ability to do business.473
Such confidentiality practices are not, however, recognized by all
employers. Some employers demand that their in-house medical
464. See id at 4.
465. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 27.
466. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 64 (statement of Janlori Goldman,
Deputy Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology).
467. See Kowalski Testimony, supra note 461, at 4-5.
468. See Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 330 (statement of Dr. Martin
Sepulveda of IBM).
469. See Kowalski Testimony, supra note 461, at 4.
470. See PRIVACY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at 266-67.
471. See Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 329-30 (statement of Dr. Martin
Sepulveda of IBM).
472. See Kowalski Testimony, supra note 461, at 5.
473. See id. at 6. These employers may have a vested interest in minimizing access to
identifiable health information; using data in aggregated form may reduce their exposure
to employee discrimination lawsuits based on disabilities. Cf. id. at 5 (noting that "sound,
effective confidentiality policies can help [a] company avoid allegation[s] of
discrimination against ill or injured employees"). Of course, if employees are not aware
that employers have access to their personal health information, they are not likely to
suspect discrimination as a cause for an adverse employment action and are thus less
likely to bring a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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staff reveal diagnoses and other treatment information when
explaining why employees must miss work or cannot perform certain
tasks.474 Because state confidentiality laws frequently provide weak
protection for employee medical records, in-house medical staff often
have no legal basis to refuse such demands;475 those who refuse
anyway on ethical grounds are sometimes threatened with dismissal
or actually fired.476  Furthermore, while some contract benefits
administrators will not release identifiable claims data on specific
employees to self-insured employers,477 others will do so on
demand. 7 8 The pressure to retain the employer as a customer likely
plays a role in their decision to cooperate.479
Few legal restrictions currently govern employers' use of
employee health data.40 The 1996 legislative survey of state health
confidentiality laws found that only nine states impose a statutory
duty of confidentiality on non-health care institutions, including
employers.481 One of these states, California, requires employers to
"establish appropriate procedures to ensure the confidentiality and
protection" of employees' health information; prohibits the use or
disclosure of such information, with some exceptions, without
employee authorization; and forbids discrimination against
employees who refuse to give authorization .41 At the federal level,
474. See id. at 4.
475. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 116-17 (prepared
statement of the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses).
476. See id. at 117; Kowalski Testimony, supra note 461, at 4.
477. See Larsen Testimony, supra note 28, at 15. Mr. Larsen noted, however, that if
"push came to shove," the self-insured employer could probably obtain the claims
information anyway because "it is really their data. It's their plan." Id. at 32.
47& See Kathleen Fyffe, Testimony on Behalf of the Health Insurance Association of
America Before the Subcomm. on Privacy and Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on
Vital and Health Statistics 34 (Feb. 3, 1997) (unpublished transcript, on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Fyffe Testimony].
479. Cf. Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 64 (statement of Janlori Goldman,
Deputy Director of the Center for Democracy and Technology) ("A few insurers have
been candid enough to concede that their primary business relationship is with the
employer/customer and not the employee/patient."); Fyffe Testimony, supra note 478, at
35 ("It is a challenging relationship [between the employer and the benefits
administrator]. The contracts are renewed yearly, and there is quite a bit of
competition.").
480. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 116 (statement of
the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses) (noting that state laws
frequently provide inadequate protection for employee medical records); Hearings on S.
1360, supra note 54, at 62 (statement of Janlori Goldman, Deputy Director of the Center
for Democracy and Technology) (noting that no federal law prevents self-insured
employers from obtaining employees' health data from benefit plans).
481. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 51.
482. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.20(a)-(c) (West 1982).
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the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") forbids
discrimination against employees with disabilities4"3 but does not
address the complete range of health privacy issues at the
workplace.1 4 Furthermore, as discussed in Part II, courts have
expressly recognized, in the absence of contrary law, the right of self-
insured employers to monitor their employees' medical claims for the
purpose of controlling costs.45
Essentially all legislative proposals would apply to employers to
the extent that they provide or pay for health care or process health
information for their employees." 6  The Administration has,
however, adopted the view that employers should be subject to a
federal confidentiality law only when serving as a provider or payer
and not when processing employee health data obtained through
other means.4 The Administration believes that a "limitation on
use" provision-a basic restriction contained in all proposed
confidentiality legislation-is sufficient to prohibit self-insured
employers from using employee health data for purposes unrelated to
payment and to prohibit employers who provide care from using
information for purposes other than treatment.M
Representatives of the occupational health industry have
criticized the Administration's proposal as narrow, arguing that
regulating employers only to the extent that they provide or pay for
care would not address the full range of situations in which employers
might obtain-and misuse-employee health information.8 9  In
483. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1994).
484. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 15. The ADA's
confidentiality provisions apply only to employers with 15 or more employees. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 12111(5), 12112(d) (1994). Even when applicable, these provisions offer only
limited protection for employees. Employers must treat as confidential all health-related
information obtained from medical examinations or medical inquiries as part of an
employee health program; this information must be maintained in files separate from
regular personnel files. See id. § 12112(d)(3)(B). Employers may, however, disclose the
information for certain enumerated purposes, including informing supervisors of
necessary work accommodations for an employee. See id. The statute does not expressly
impose a redisclosure prohibition on those who receive this information. See id.
Furthermore, the confidentiality provisions apply only to information obtained from
employees as part of an employee health program at the worksite. See id.
§ 12112(d)(3)(B), (d)(4)(B)-(C). The provisions apparently do not apply to employee
health information obtained by other means, such as asking the contract benefits
administrator for a list of medications prescribed by an employee's personal physician.
485. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text (discussing the court's opinion in
Doe v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 72 F.3d 1133 (3d Cir. 1995)).
486. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 15.
487. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 20,26-27.
488. See id. at 26-27.
489. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 118 (prepared
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recognition of the serious ramifications of privacy intrusions at the
workplace, the NCVHS has also implicitly questioned whether a
limitation on use provision is sufficient protection in the employer-
employee context; the Committee suggested that all legislation
proposed thus far inadequately addresses the range of possible
intrusions into employees' privacy.4 0  The occupational health
industry has concurred with the Committee's assessment by
recommending a variety of additional confidentiality safeguards that
any federal legislation should incorporate, including a prohibition on
coercive practices used to obtain specific employee health
information from in-house medical staff.
491
E. Paper or Computerization?
As discussed in Part II, the use of technology and
computerization in health information processing is growing.492 It is
widely acknowledged that computerization poses risks to patients'
privacy, enabling large numbers of authorized users to obtain
confidential data with ease.493  Advocacy groups are particularly
concerned that patients' computerized records will be linked to
massive health databases allowing users from around the nation or
world to access these records using a unique patient identifier
number.494 They claim that many of the health confidentiality bills
would require patients and providers to switch to computerized
information systems and participate in these databases.495 Because of
these concerns, several privacy groups argue that the principle of
informed consent requires that patients be allowed to prohibit
computerization of their personal information or, at the least, links to
shared databases. 496  At least one bill currently before Congress
statement of the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses). Other situations
in which employers frequently obtain employee health information outside of the
treatment or payment process include voluntary wellness programs and mandatory drug
tests. See id.
490. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 15.
491. See Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 125 (prepared
statement of the American College of Occupational and Environmental Medicine); id. at
120 (prepared statement of the American Association of Occupational Health Nurses).
492 See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
493. See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
494. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 140 (statement of the Consumer
Project on Technology).
495. See, e.g., Breitenstein & Nagel, supra note 194, at B6 (referring to "mandatory
computerization").
496. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 159 (statement of American
Psychiatric Association); Nagel Statement, supra note 193, at 2-4; ACLU, supra note 251,
1998]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
would give patients such power, requiring health information trustees
to segregate and maintain identifiable information designated by the
patient, other than billing data, outside of any computerized
networked system.
497
This approach has been expressly rejected by others. In its
report to HHS, the NCVHS concluded that it was "not sympathetic
to the notion that patients should have a choice in the technology
used to create, store and transmit health information. '49  The
Committee explained that Congress had already voiced its approval
for the use of computerization to reduce the cost of care499 and that it
would be impractical and burdensome for providers and payers to
maintain separately the records of some individuals on paper."' It
went on to suggest that "[c]omputers are an inevitable part of
modem health care .... Patients must accept this and move on to
debate the proper protections for records in a computerized
environment." 0' 1 The Clinton Administration adopted this view in its
recommendations to Congress, adding that giving patients such
detailed control over the means by which information flows would
actually be harmful because "the effective and rapid processing of
information, often for the benefit of the patient, depends on
computerized systems." 5°2
F. Uniformity and Preemption
In its report to HHS, the NCVHS suggested that the issue of
preemption remains "the most difficult conflict" in the health privacy
debate. 3 Privacy advocates, patients rights organizations, and
physicians groups have argued vigorously that federal law must not
preempt state laws that offer more stringent protection or that
provide a more expansive right to inspect one's medical records; 504 in
other words, federal law should serve merely as a "floor" providing
at 1-2.
497. See S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 202(f) (1997).
498. NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 10.
499. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1320d, Historical and Revision Notes (West Supp. 1998) (Purpose of Administrative
Simplification).
500. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 10.
501. Id.
502. HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 24.
503. NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 16.
504. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 163-64 (statement of the
American Psychiatric Association); id. at 141-42 (statement of the Consumer Project on
Technology); Palmisano Statement, supra note 348, at 46.
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minimum protection for health information. Advocates are
concerned that complete preemption would prevent states from
providing additional levels of protection for certain kinds of
information, notably that which pertains to HIV status and mental
health.5 AIDS and mental health advocacy groups point to the
stigma and discrimination attached to HIV and mental illness and
note that unwanted disclosure of information related to these
conditions can have potentially dire social and economic
consequences. 6 They also assert that strict confidentiality is
necessary to encourage those who suffer from these illnesses to seek
treatment.5 7 The Supreme Court recently added support to this view
in Jaffe v. Redman."' Citing embarrassment caused by unwanted
disclosure and noting that "[e]ffective psychotherapy ... depends
upon an atmosphere of confidence and trust," ' 9 the Court recognized
a federal privilege protecting confidential communications between
mental health professionals and their patients. 1 ° Privacy advocates
argue that states should be free to respond to concerns such as those
cited by the Court by enacting more stringent confidentiality
protections than those contained in a federal law.5 '
Insurers, health plans, information processors, and other health
care entities with interstate operations have just as clearly indicated
that they will only support legislation that offers nearly complete
preemption. 12 In their view, any federal law must provide both a
"floor" and, to the extent possible, a "ceiling" for confidentiality
protection. Legislation that would permit states to create more
505. See Hearing on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 87-88 (statement of the American
Psychological Association); Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 418 (prepared
statement of Aimee R. Berenson of the AIDS Action Council).
506. See Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 154-55 (statement of the American
Psychiatric Association); Eileen Hansen, Prepared Statement on Behalf of the AIDS
Legal Referral Panel Before the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 1 (June 3,
1997) (unpublished statement, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
507. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 154-55 (statement of the
American Psychiatric Association).
508. 518 U.S. 1 (1996).
509. Id. at 10.
510. See id. at 10-11.
511. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 87-88 (statement of the American
Psychological Association); id. at 164 (statement of the American Psychiatric
Association); id. at 101 (statement of the ACLU).
512. See, e.g., Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 127 (prepared
statement of the Health Insurance Association of America); Letter from James D.
Bentley, Senior Vice-President for Policy, American Hospital Association, to John P.
Fanning, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services 1 (July 16, 1997) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review); Thompson Statement, supra note 54, at 3.
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stringent confidentiality laws would offer little, if any, improvement
over the existing system of haphazard state laws that inhibit the flow
of data."'3
Health confidentiality bills reflecting the views of both industry
and privacy advocates have been introduced in Congress. The
Health Care Personal Information Nondisclosure Act of 1998114 and
the Consumer Health and Research Technology Protection Act"'
would preempt state law generally with the exception of laws
conferring more stringent protections on public health and mental
health information. By contrast, the Medical Information Privacy
and Security Act of 199716 and the Medical Privacy in the Age of
New Technologies Act of 1997517 have taken the privacy advocates'
view that states should be able to enact more stringent confidentiality
protections for any kind of health-related information. The Clinton
Administration has adopted the privacy advocates' position as well. 18
Explaining its support for more restrictive state laws, the
Administration has noted that federal statutes pertaining to privacy
rights traditionally preempt only weaker state laws; that states have
been careful in their efforts to protect specific classes of information
such as HIV and mental health; and that allowing the states to enact
more stringent laws would enable the federal government to learn
from their experiences.5 19 The Administration has not, however,
ruled out revisiting the preemption issue at a future date. If
permitting states to enact more stringent laws proves confusing to
providers or problematic for the health care payment system, it
would recommend amending the law to provide more complete
preemption.5 20
While reaching consensus on the issue of preemption will not be
easy,521 political realities suggest that it is unlikely a federal law will
be enacted without, at the least, preemption exemptions for public
and mental health information. Some industry groups have, in fact,
conceded this point.522 It is less likely, however, that a federal law
513. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 4077, supra note 48, at 258-59 (prepared statement of
Joel E. Gimpel on behalf of the Workgroup for Electronic Data Interchange).
514. See S. 1921, 105th Cong. § 401(a), (c) (1998).
515. See H.R. 3900, 105th Cong. § 403(a), (c) (1998).
516. See S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 401(a) (1997).
517. See H.R. 1815, 105th Cong. § 402(a) (1997).
518. See HHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 155, at 73-75.
519. See id.
520. See id. at 17.
521. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 16.
522. See, e.g., Hearing on S. 1368, supra note 156, at 87 (1998) (statement of the
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will incorporate another suggestion made by some privacy
advocates-more stringent protections within the federal law for
particularly "sensitive" information, notably that related to genetic
material and mental health.5 3 Users of health care information, as
well as many commentators, defend the need for uniformity of
protection within the federal law.5 4 Instituting multiple levels of
protection for different kinds of data, health insurers and
commentators respond, will confuse providers and payers and will
offer little improvement over the current patchwork of state laws.
52
Because "[c]onfidentiality is in the eye of the beholder,"
commentators also suggest that it would be presumptuous for
Congress to define what is particularly sensitive.526 An individual
with cancer, for example, might consider information pertaining to
her illness as sensitive as a patient who is HIV positive, but under the
privacy advocates' proposal, the cancer patient might not enjoy the
same level of confidentiality.527  Finally, commentators have
expressed concern that treating particular classes of information
differently is a slippery slope that would lead to periodic amendment
of the federal law to confer more stringent protection on additional
conditions.5 The health care industry instead argues that all health
information is sensitive and that a federal law should provide all
American Association of Health Plans); NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at
16 ("No one has suggested or is likely to support a uniform federal public health law.");
Letter from James D. Bentley to John P. Fanning, supra note 512, at 1; The Outcry over
HHS's Privacy Proposals, supra note 455, at 8 (discussing the willingness of the
Association for Electronic Health Care Transactions to consider a compromise on the
issue of preemption of public health and mental health laws).
523. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1360, supra note 54, at 88 (statement of the American
Psychological Association); NCHVS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 17. For
additional discussion of why mental health information deserves special protection, see
Elaine Brooks et al., Confidentiality and Right to Privacy Issues in Mental Health
Managed Care, 19 WHrITIER L. REv. 39 (1997).
524. See, e.g., Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 128 (prepared
statement of the Health Insurance Association of America); GOSTIN ET AL., supra note
143, at 43, 156; LoWRANCE, supra note 66, at 16-17.
525. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 75 (statement of Merida L. Johns,
President of the American Health Information Management Association) (suggesting
that special precautions for certain kinds of information will confuse providers); Privacy
in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 94 (statement of John T. Nielsen on
behalf of the American Association of Health Plans) (arguing that multiple levels of
protection will not improve the current situation).
526. Gellman Statement, supra note 446, at 63.
527. See, e.g., GOSTIN ETAL., supra note 143, at 156.
528. One observer has described this concern as the "disease of the month
phenomenon." Robert Gellman, Chairman Statement, Subcomm. on Privacy and
Confidentiality of the Nat'l Comm. on Vital and Health Statistics 53 (Jan. 13, 1997)
(unpublished transcript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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information with the same level of strong protection.52 9 Thus far,
many of the comprehensive proposals introduced in Congress have
adopted the industry's view on the uniformity issue.5 30
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis reveals that while there are many areas of
agreement concerning privacy protections for health records, there
remain as many points of disagreement. These differences reflect the
inherent tension in the relationship between the individual's right to
privacy and society's interest in high quality, cost-effective health
care. 3 As this tension cannot be resolved completely in favor of one
interest or another, a balance must be struck that respects the
compelling claims of both interests. Reaching this balance
necessarily requires some amount of compromise by all
parties53-- especially in the following areas-so that meaningful
privacy protections can be enacted into law before the HIPAA
deadline expires.
First, law enforcement must accept new restrictions on its ability
to access individually identifiable health information. At the federal
level, where most investigation into health fraud occurs, there is little
oversight of law enforcement's ability to obtain such information;
33
the same is true in some states.534 The Clinton Administration's
proposal would not substantially change existing practice.1
35
Secretary Shalala has stated that no one should have a "free pass" to
obtain information,536 but in many cases, law enforcement effectively
has such a pass.5 37 Although law enforcement often has a compelling
529. See Hearings on H.R. 52, supra note 27, at 102-03 (statement of Sherine Gabriel
on Behalf of the Healthcare Leadership Council).
530. See S. 1921, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 3900, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 52, 105th
Cong. (1997); S. 1360, 104th Cong. (1995). But see S. 1368, 105th Cong. § 202(f) (1997)
(permitting an individual to require a health care information trustee to segregate certain
health information and to adhere to more stringent confidentiality practices); H.R. 3482,
104th Cong. § 201(c) (1996) (same).
531. See supra notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
532. See GOSTIN ET AL., supra note 143, at 12 (arguing that "[a]bsolutist positions ...
will not result in health information systems that can effectively serve" the dual goals of
providing good health care and protecting patient's privacy); NCVHS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 4 ("None of these benefits will be achieved
unless everyone approaches the legislative process with a spirit of compromise.").
533. See supra notes 420-28 and accompanying text.
534. See supra text accompanying note 419.
535. See supra notes 449-54 and accompanying text.
536. Privacy in the Electronic Age Hearings, supra note 75, at 24 (prepared statement
of Donna Shalala, Secretary of HHS).
537. See supra notes 420-28 and accompanying text.
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need to obtain health data, the sensitive nature of this information
and the ramifications of its use are of such import that agencies
should always have to demonstrate this need to a court before
accessing records. Law enforcement officials claim that such a
requirement would be unduly burdensome,5 38  but tightened
restrictions are not without precedent. Federal law already requires
law enforcement agencies to obtain a court order before accessing
personally identifiable information concerning cable television
subscriptions;5 3 9 officials must establish by clear and convincing
evidence that the information sought is material to the present
investigation.540 Our health-related information, undoubtedly as
sensitive, surely deserves as much protection.
Second, privacy advocates must acknowledge the presence and
benefits of technology in health information processing. The
confidentiality debate has frequently dwelled on the risks posed by
computerization at the expense of recognizing its benefits.5 41 While
these risks are real and must be addressed in the legislation, they
should not blind us to the potential gains in both quality and
efficiency of care. Rather than fight the use of new information
technologies in health care, privacy advocates should accept their
presence and expend their energy assisting in the creation and
enforcement of clear and meaningful guidelines governing the use
and disclosure of information.542 It would be both unrealistic and a
waste of limited resources to require those who use health
information to create two systems, computerized and paper-based,
for its storage and transfer.5 43 The right to privacy is compelling but
not absolute and cannot be permitted to disrupt the entire health care
treatment and payment system. As one commentator has observed,
"[i]ndividuals already foriego significant levels of privacy in order to
obtain the social goods that benefit society collectively," and while
not every person is satisfied with this "social contract ... all
individuals benefit." 44 For this reason, he has noted, "[a] complex
modern society cannot elevate each person's interest in privacy above
other important societal interests."5 45
538. See supra notes 440.48 and accompanying text.
539. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(h) (1994).
540. See id.
541. The NCVHS reached the same conclusion in its report. See NCVHS
RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 6.
542. See id. at 10.
543. See id.
544. Gostin, supra note 12, at 515.
545. Id.
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Third, given the increasingly integrated nature of the health care
industry and its growing reliance on computerized patient records
and electronic claims processing, uniformity in protection and
substantial preemption of state law are necessary. 46 Incorporating
more stringent privacy protections within the federal law for
information some deem particularly "sensitive," notably that related
to genetic material and mental illness, would undermine one of the
fundamental reasons for enacting a federal law and would result in
additional administrative burdens, confusion, and possibly
inadvertent violations.547 Similarly, permitting states to enact more
restrictive confidentiality provisions for any kind of health
information would offer little, if any, improvement over the status
quo, which requires payment and treatment entities to attempt to
comply with as many as fifty sets of laws.
At the same time, however, users of health information cannot
realistically expect complete preemption. First, in deference to the
states' longstanding role as guardians of the public health, a federal
confidentiality law should not preempt state reporting laws or more
stringent public health laws. Public health agencies have established
an admirable record of protecting individuals' confidentiality while
operating under laws particular to each state.5 48 These laws function
well and have the support of the state agencies; to preempt those that
are more stringent would only cause confusion among public health
officials. 549 Second, in deference to the fast-approaching HIPAA
deadline, the health care industry should accept the possibility of
stronger state laws regarding the confidentiality of mental health
information. Given the strong opposition to total preemption by the
mental health community, as well as the Supreme Court's recent
recognition of the sensitivity of such information, preemption of
stronger state laws in this area may be politically unrealistic.
Incorporating these two limited exceptions to preemption strikes a
reasonable balance between the need for substantial uniformity on
one hand, and respect for the functions of state government and
awareness of the need to pass confidentiality legislation in a timely
manner, on the other.550
546. See supra notes 27, 161-70 and accompanying text.
547. See supra notes 169, 524-25 and accompanying text.
548. See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
549. See supra notes 384-85 and accompanying text.
550. As previously noted, some users of health care information understand the need
for compromise in these areas and have expressed a willingness to accept federal
legislation permitting more stringent public health and mental health confidentiality laws
at the state level. See supra notes 521-22 and accompanying text.
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Any meaningful federal health confidentiality law must also
include express restrictions on employers' ability to access
employees' health information. While the ADA provides a measure
of protection for some employees, it does not address the full
spectrum of potential privacy violations in the workplace."
Furthermore, although current legislative proposals would limit the
use of data by any trustee to the purpose for which it was collected, 2
the potential consequences of an employer learning unfavorable
information about an employee are so serious that a more definitive
wall between personal health information and employment should be
constructed. At the least, employers should not be allowed to coerce
in-house medical staff into disclosing specific health-related
information about employees, and self-insured employers should not
be permitted to obtain individually identifiable treatment and
prescription information about their employees from their benefit
plan administrators. 53 While employers have a legitimate need to
regulate expenses and to ensure workplace safety, the experience of
companies with voluntary restrictions demonstrates that they can do
so using non-identifiable or only generalized information. 4
Many other areas, of course, require compromise.
Unfortunately, if the past is any indication, it is by no means certain
that compromise will be forthcoming. Eighteen years have passed
since the 96th Congress considered the first comprehensive
legislation, yet we are still without uniform privacy protection for our
most sensitive information.555 While genuine support exists for a
federal law, many parties have been unwilling to make the
concessions necessary to accomplish this goal. 6 Observers are split
as to whether the 105th Congress will distinguish itself in this
regard.557 If it does not, there is a substantial likelihood that much of
551. See supra notes 483-84 and accompanying text.
552. See supra note 488 and accompanying text.
553. Cf. Letter from James D. Bentley to John P. Fanning, supra note 512, at 2
(expressing the American Hospital Association's view that self-insured employers should
be covered by federal confidentiality legislation).
554. See supra notes 467-73 and accompanying text.
555. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
556. The NCVHS noted, for example, that while users of health information professed
support for patient privacy, they did not want restrictions on their ability to use or obtain
data. See NCVHS RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 185, at 3. The Committee found this
position "unreasonable." Id. Responding to arguments by privacy advocates, the
Committee also noted that "no one can expect that the health care system will be
restructured solely in the interests of privacy." Id.
557. Privacy consultant Robert Gellman does not believe the 105th Congress will pass
a bill, but Thomas Gilligan, a lobbyist for the health information processing industry, has
1998]
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our sensitive health information will be left to the protection of
regulations alone."
BARTLEY L. BAREFOOT
estimated the odds at 60-40 that a bill will pass. See The Outcry over HHS's Privacy
Proposals, supra note 455, at 8.
558. See supra notes 233-36 and accompanying text.
